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Abstract
Cryptography is a dual-edged sword. On the one hand, it allows secure
electronic communications by legitimate users. On the other hand, it can be
used by criminals to thwart law enforcement efforts and by foreign countries
to prevent security agencies from gathering intelligence information about
these countries.
However, the widespread use of cryptography is critical to the establishment of the Information Superhighway.

In order to prevent illegal users

from enjoying the same convenience, the most straight forward solution is to
escrow every user's private key.
Governments' prime concern focuses on law enforcement and national
security. However, users' major worries are the security and potential abuses
of these systems by the authorities. This is particularly important because,
with the explosive growth of the Internet, a user's private key can be used
to access a wide range of information about him/her.
In recent years, numerous key escrow schemes have been proposed but
their success will ultimately depend on the trust and acceptance by users.
Unfortunately, all proposed systems suffer from one common weakness:
concentration of trust. Even if the private key is split among several trustees,
it is still too concentrated and thus too insecure.
Another subtle yet equally important weakness is the contradiction to the
spirit of democracy. In these schemes, user's fundamental right of privacy
is at the mercy of the governments and a few trustees. It is unfair for most
legitimate users to hand over their private keys to the authorities (or their
agents), even before they have started any electronic communication. Given
the fact that governments are strong and users are weak, this is unfair and
undemocratic.
This thesis proposes a key escrow scheme which is not only secure but also
fair and democratic by introducing the concept of "electronic jury" similar
to the jury system in the common law. This is a new mechanism to achieve
proper balance of power and mutual trust by both users and authorities by
distributing the key shares in the hands of electronic jury until they are
required for lawful recovery.
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to maintain

Roosevelt
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enough

and a people strong enough and

its sovereign

control over the government
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[37].

Chapter 1
Introduction
This chapter firstly explains the origin of the problem and the motivation of
this thesis. It then discusses the nature of this problem. Objectives are then
set out as a roadmap for the remaining parts of this thesis. As key escrow is
a very complex issue, this chapter places a scope of study in this thesis.

1.1

Motivation

Rapid advances in computer and telecommunication technologies have revolutionarizd people's ways of communications, and have become an essential
element of modern life. They have removed distance as a geographical barrier
and have turned the world into a big global village.
As open communication networks are insecure, users need to use cryptography to protect their privacy in modern communications. However, cryptography is a dual-edged sword. While strong cryptography provides absolute
privacy unavailable before, it can be abused by criminals to avoid electronic
surveillance so that it also presents a serious threat to effective law enforcement and national security. In fact, cryptography has upset the traditional
balance of power between individuals and authorities.
Government's past strategy was to impose strict control in the use of cryptography (e.g., by Hmiting the length of the encryption key). This seriously
reduces the protection to legitimate users and thus cannot be accepted as a
long-term solution for secure communications in the emerging information society. Realising this, government's new approach is to allow the widespread
use of cryptography subject to the condition that every user must escrow
his/her decryption key with a trusted party to enable emergency key recovery for law enforcement purposes. Besides other inherent security problems,

such key escrow systems may be abused by the authorities to intrude into
users' privacy in the name of law enforcement by obtaining the decryption
keys to conduct wiretaps. Moreover, it is conceptually wrong to force users
(either by law or by creating a substantial market [26]) to hand over their decryption keys to the authorities even before they have started any electronic
communications. Instead, they should be required to do so only if they are
suspected of committing a serious crime.
Thus, before one can fully relax and enjoy the fruit of the proximity and
accessibility provided by the emerging Information Superhighway, one must
guard against barbarism due to the abuse of privacy by users or tyranny due
to the abuse of power by authorities in the emerging electronic community.
This dilemma is the motivation behind this thesis.

1.2

Nature of the Problem

In order to strike a new balance of power between individuals and authorities,
one must fully appreciate the nature of this problem:
• This is an ethical problem because it involves social values and human
judgement of what is good and what is bad about privacy. If one believes that privacy is evil and intrusion of one's privacy by government
is meritorious because it only shows that the government really cares
about him/her, then the discussion can end here. Also, one believes
that a democratic society is better than a totalitarian one.
• This is a political problem because there is power struggle between
users and authority. It is the new battle field between ruling class and
the ruled class which should ideally lead to a rational compromise or
balance of power between two classes.
• This is a legal problem because it involves enforcement of law and
order (or policing) extended to the electronic media. A suspect must
be assumed innocent until proven guilty and the process must not only
be fair but also seen to be fair. In case of doubt, the suspect should gain
the credit. These legal principles should also be held in the cyberspace.
• This is a cryptographic problem because a cryptographic solution must
be sought to support the best compromise at national and international
levels.

Most important of all, the solution to this problem must be trusted and
accepted by users because their participation is paramount to the ultimate
success of any key escrow system.

1.3

Objectives

This thesis proposes a new approach to the key escrow system. The crux of
the whole issue is the mutual trust by both users and authorities. The jury
system in common law has earned the trust of both the general public and
authorities as an independent and impartial tribunal for settling disputes
and it has a long history of protecting individual's civil liberty from the
encroachment of the authorities. This thesis investigates how this implicit
trust system can be applied to the key escrow problem.

As a result, the

objectives of this thesis are as follows:
• Evaluate the impact of cryptography on the emerging Information Superhighway.
• Evaluate current key escrow schemes.
• Explore the jury system and its characteristics.
• Abstract the trust model behind the jury system.
• Apply this trust model to the key escrow situation.
• Illustrate how to build a secure, fair and democratic key escrow scheme
using this model.
• Analyse the security of this new scheme.
• Consider some practical issues related to this new scheme.

1.4

Scope of Study

This thesis is mainly concerned with large-scale national and international
key escrow systems for confidentiality purpose only and it will not discuss
the following topics:

• Commercial key escrow systems within the user's organization which
serves primarily to protect against the loss of data within the organization, e.g., Nortel's Entrust or Bankers Trust.
• Cryptographic keys for data integrity and authentication because they
do not encrypt messages and do not interfere with law enforcement
investigation and intelligence gathering. In fact, they tend to bind the
source and message together and help to enforce accountability.

1.5 Outline
The outline of this thesis conforms very closely with the above objectives.
Chapter 2 starts by defining privacy and then briefly describes the development and application of cryptography to protect privacy in the emerging
Information Superhighway. Chapter 3 highlights some problems and potential dangers with existing key escrow schemes and summarises the contribution of this thesis to solve these problems. In chapter 4, a review of some
of the related works and their drawbacks is provided. It points out the importance of mutual trust by users and authorities in these systems and leads
to the investigation of the jury system in chapter 5. Chapter 5 briefly summarises the development and features of the jury system and its similarities
with the counterparts in continental law. Based on the trust model implicit
in the jury system, chapter 6 proposes a new approach to key escrow by
the introduction of "electronic jury system" and shows how to design three
different democratic key escrow schemes. Chapter 7 evaluates the strengths
and possible attacks of the three proposed schemes. Some counter-measures
are proposed to prevent or minimize these attacks. Chapter 8 explores some
practical issues related to the implementation of these schemes. Chapter 9
draws a conclusion about democratic key escrow schemes. In the appendix,
the source code for implementation of scheme 3 in Java language is also
included.

Chapter 2
Importance of Cryptography
and Information Superhighway
This chapter briefly describes the development and application of cryptography to protect privacy in the emerging Information Superhighway.

2.1

Privacy Issue

This section gives an informal review of the privacy issue because the protection of privacy is the central theme in this thesis.
Privacy lies at the heart of freedom and it is the right most valued. Privacy is essentially the right to be left alone. A more comprehensive definition
of privacy as claim or right is given by A. Westin [22]:
Claim of individuals, groups, or institutions to determine for
when, how, and to what extent information

themselves

about them is communicated

to

others.
Privacy can be conceived roughly as a cluster of three related but independent components [22]:
• Secrecy:

information

• Anonymity:

about an individual

attention paid to an individual.

• Solitude: access to an individual.
A breach in any of the above components
one's

privacy.

constitutes

an intrusion

into

The value of privacy is associated with the following ideas [41]:
• Personal autonomy: this means that individuals are free from interference by authorities and they can act according to their own judgement
and not have collective values forced upon them.
• Self-fulfilment: it is argued that privacy provides the best conditions
under which individuals may flourish. The dropping of the public mask,
the communion of the intimates and the expression of the deepest emotions are crucial to maintain the identity and well-being of each individual.
The means to maintain one's privacy include control over both one's personal life and information. Privacy is also closely implicated in the notions
of respect and self-respect, of love, friendship, trust, freedom and protection
of personal liberty.
Protection of right to privacy is so fundamental that it can be found in
many enacted laws and treaties, such as:
• The Fourth Amendment of the American Constitution.
• The Article 12 of the United Nation's Declaration of Human Rights.
• The Article 8 of the European Convention of Human Rights.
Equally important is the privacy of commercial enterprises. Commercial
privacy protects intellectual property, corporate secret and financial transactions and it is one of the cornerstones in capitalistic economy and financial
stability.
In this thesis, privacy refers to both personal and commercial privacy
without distinguishing them unless expressly stated otherwise.

Likewise,

"user" refers to individual, group or institution whose privacy is the main
concern in this thesis.

2.2

Development of Cryptography

This section briefly reviews the development of cryptography and its importance to electronic communications and most of the materials in this section
can be found in [12] and [14]. Before moving on, the following provides a

working definition of cryptography and encryption:
Cryptography

is the art or science

be used to hide its information
tected modification,
Encryption

prevent repudiation,

2.2.1

and/or prevent

data in such a manner

who does not possess

unscrambled

establish authenticity,

is a branch of cryptography

rithm to scramble
anyone

content,

of keeping a message

cryptographic

secure.
prevent

unauthorised

that uses a mathematical
that renders

It can
undeuse.
algo-

it unintelligible

to

key necessary for it and can be

only with the knowledge of the key.

Symmetric Cryptography and Its Weaknesses

Cryptography used to be the exclusive domain of government especially in
military and diplomatic circles. However, with the advent of modern computers and communications, there has been growing commercial and academic
interest in cryptography for civilian applications.
In 1975, U.S. government proposed the Data Encryption Standard (DES)
for the protection of sensitive but unclassified information by government
agencies.

DES is a symmetric cryptosystem in which the same secret key

is used to both encrypt and decrypt the message and it is now extensively
used by the financial sector to protect financial transactions.

The public

disclosure of the DES algorithm provided inspiration for much research and
new designs. National Security Agency (NSA) in USA has made numerous
attempts to either stop or to control the research work by the academic
community without success (see chapter 6 in [14]): the genie is out and it
cannot be put back in bottle again.
Symmetric cryptosystems suffer from the following drawbacks:
The secret key needs to be agreed in advance of any communication.
• It is difficult for the sender to distribute the secret key securely to the
receiver.
• The security lies completely in the secrecy of the secret key.

Com-

promising the secret key allows anyone to decrypt the message or to
tamper with the messages.

• As the number n of participants increases, the number of secret keys
required increases in the order of n^.
• In the case of dispute, it is difficult to decide which party has cheated
because both parties know the secret key.
Public key cryptosystems attempt to address these problems. However,
any public key used in public key cryptography must be properly authenticated.

2.2.2

Public key Cryptography

In 1976, Diffie and Hellman introduced the concept of public key which allows parties to exchange encrypted data without communicating a shared
secret key in advance. Rather than sharing a single secret key, a public key
cryptosystem uses two keys: a public key that can be disclosed to the public
and used to encrypt data and a corresponding private key that is kept secret
and used to decrypt the data. Currently, RSA is the most famous and widely
used public-key cryptosystem.
Public key cryptography offers the following unique features:
• Secure communication is possible without the need to share a secret
key in advance.
• The authenticity of a message by a sender can be verified by the receiver.
These properties are vital for establishing large scale information infrastructures (e.g., electronic commerce).

2.2.3

Importance of Cryptography

As the volume of sensitive information flow across insecure networks is growing rapidly, strong cryptography is an essential tool for protecting users'
privacy.
The importance of cryptography to users includes:
• Protection of privacy such as personal records or financial data or business transactions from eavesdropping.

• Protection of financial assets from sabotage, fraud, theft or commercial
espionage of proprietary data or intellectual property.
• Protection of stored information from unauthorised access or disclosure.
Indeed, cryptography is critical to the development of the Information Superhighway and electronic commerce. Now so much economic activities occur
through electronic networks that restriction in deploying strong cryptography
is dangerous. However, due to severe government control, the widespread use
of cryptography has not materialised.

2.3

Potential Threats of Cryptography

This section investigates some threats of cryptography to society and users.
In an extreme situation, abuses of cryptography may create chaos and social
disorder known as "Crypto Anarchy".

2.3.1

Threats

Cryptography presents a conflict between privacy and law enforcement and
intelligence gathering. Strong cryptography can virtually lock out all stored
files and communications and thwart investigation by making legally intercepted messages unreadable. Thus, criminals can be immune from lawful
interception so that they can act and conspire with impunity. The use of
cryptography seriously hampers this important law enforcement tool and
poses a serious social threat to public safety and national security.

The

potential threats of cryptography to society include:
• It can be used by terrorist groups to further terrorism (e.g., a plot to
bomb a building or to assassinate a pohtical figure).
• It can be used by criminal rings to further organized crime (e.g., extortion, kidnapping, drug trafficking, child pornography, murder or money
laundering).
• It facilitates fraud and encourages corruption without fear of being
discovered.
• It can interfere with foreign intelligence operations.

Cryptography can also be a threat to users themselves. Potential threats
to users themselves include:
• Lost keys by accident (e.g., by carelessness or sudden death of keyholder).
• Lost keys by intent (e.g., by disgruntled former employee or the key is
held in ransom for blackmail).
• Keys may be used to cover up fraud or espionage (e.g., by employee).
Loss of key means that valuable data becomes inaccessible. Huge financial loss may result if the lost key cannot be recovered and the encrypted
information will be lost forever.

2.3.2

Crypto Anarchy

Cryptography allows absolute freedom of communications unprecedented before in history. If cryptography is not properly harnessed, the widespread deployment of cryptography may lead to social disorder and chaos.

horrible

vision of crypto anarchy in abusing cryptography is depicted in [29 .
In crypto anarchy, it is no longer possible for governments to control
information (e.g., to compile dossiers) and to regulate economic activities
(e.g, collection of tax).

Governments crumbled and disappeared.

Instead,

they are replaced by virtual communities of individuals doing as they wish
without interference.
Crypto anarchy becomes the safe havens for many criminal activities such
as tax evasion, money laundering, espionage, contract killing and data havens
for storing and marketing illegal material. This brings the civilization back
to a new dark age of barbarism history never witnessed before. In Dorothy
E. Denning's own word.
It is like an automobile with no brakes, no seat belts, no pollution

controls,

no licence, no way of getting in after you've locked your keys in the car [12].
Is this desirable? Is this inevitable?
To prevent this phenomenon from happening, the new cryptographic right
must be properly matched by the corresponding new responsibility.

2.4

Government Policy

This section investigates the fundamental change in government policy in
cryptography from strict control of use to strict access to decryption key.
Encryption technology used to be tightly controlled by governments to
protect public and national security. Control included export control, limiting the length of the encryption key or hcensing the use. However, stringent
control created numerous problems:
• Strict control weakens the protection of user's privacy.
• Strict control harms export competitiveness because the affected industry is at a disadvantage to compete globally.
• Industry needs two sets of products for domestic and international applications and this creates extra cost and interoperability problem.
• Strong encryption algorithms and softwares (e.g., PGP) are readily
available in many computer sites. Strict control can only hurt most legitimate users but certainly cannot prevent criminals from using them.
Recently, there is a fundamental change in governments' policy: from
strict control of usage in cryptography to mandatory escrowing of decryption
key.
To relax the use of strong encryption with long keys, an emergency decryption capability by government must be provided.

The most straight

forward solution is by key archive through a trustee or key escrow authority
appointed or licensed by the governments.
An encrypted message normally contains a header with the session key
encrypted under the public key of the recipient. Access is then possible using
the escrowed private key to recover the session key and then to decrypt the
encrypted data with the session key.
The key archive services provided by key escrow authorities will be available to the government agencies upon court order and to the owners of the
keys (called self-escrow).
Although criminals might obtain encryption products from some underground servers and bulletin boards or they can develop their own noncompliant products, they have to face interoperability problem with licensed
ones, so their use will be limited. At minimum, the key escrow system deters

criminals from the embarrassing situation of using the convenience of the
legitimate key management infrastructure for illegal purposes.

2.5

Information Superhighway

The Information Superhighway is in the making. This is possible due to the
availability of global communication networks and strong cryptography. This
section examines the factors and ingredients contributing to the success of
the Information Superhighway.

2.5.1

Cryptographic Services

In order to effectively use the Information Superhighway, it is crucial that a
public key system is available and a user has a reliable way of verifying the
authenticity of public keys.
In general, the following cryptographic services are required:
• Authentication of users.
• Issuing and distribution of signed certificates for public keys.
• Revocation and expiration of public keys.
• Time-stamping and notarization of electronic documents.
• Resolution of disputes.
• Private key escrow management and lawful access to private keys.

2.5.2

Key Management Infrastructures

Management and certification of public keys can be performed by a certification authority while maintaining private key archives is done by a key escrow
authority (or a trustee) though they can be combined together.
The certification authority establishes proof of identity of the person owning the corresponding private key and then signs a certificate containing the
user's public key. A certificate for a public encryption key will not be issued
unless the corresponding private decryption key is archived by the key escrow authority. The certificate can be used to verify user's public key over a
network. Separate keys can be used for encryption (for confidentiality) and

digital signature (for authentication and nonrepudiation) and separate certificates will be issued for each key. With the help of a certification authority,
confidentiality, integrity, authenticity and nonrepudiation cryptographic services can be provided. A hierarchy or network of certificate authorities can
be established to form an infrastructure for managing and certifying public
keys.
Such a key management infrastructure can be extended to form a national
and global Information Infrastructure (Nil and GII). With a key escrow facility, the Information Superhighway will not become a safe haven for illegal
activities. A global key management infrastructure with key escrow facility also requires international agreements. Thus, government initiative and
involvement is critical to make Nil and GII a reality.
Users can then access strong and globally interoperable encryption systems and key management services.
As certification authorities and key escrow authorities play crucial roles
in Nil and GII, strict standards must be developed by legislation to ensure
key integrity, confidentiality, accessibility, auditability, recovery and use. In
particular, key escrow authorities must ensure the following:
• Authorised access is possible in a timely fashion.
• Proper access procedures and legal operational safeguards are strictly
followed.
• Proper audit records of key handling events are kept.
• A high level of assurance that there is no unlawful compromise or abuse
of escrowed keys.
Some early suggestions of key escrow authorities included post office, bank
or clerks of the Federal Courts [7]. In general, they should be certified or
accredited according to their qualification, responsibility, liability and be in
the private sector rather than the government agencies.
From the security point of view, it is desirable to split the keys into a
number of shares and each share can be escrowed by a separate key escrow
authority so that the keys cannot be misused without collusion.
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Chapter 3
Challenge
This chapter briefly highlights some problems and potential dangers with
existing key escrow schemes and summarises the objectives of this thesis.

3.1

Problems with Existing Key Escrow Schemes

Existing large-scale key escrow schemes have numerous conceptual and technical problems. Typical problems are:
• It is mandatory for users to hand over their private keys to a key
escrow authority as a prerequisite to certification of their public keys
by a certification authority. This is analogous to assuming everyone is
guilty until proven innocent which nurtures fear in being wire-tapped
at any moment and this may create a chilling effect in communication

• Government may suddenly become malicious: for example in the case
that a dictator gains power, by changing the escrow policy overnight,
the government can then start massive recovery of the escrowed keys
and embark upon mass wire-tapping.
• Trustees are the weak link of the system: they can be easily attacked
because they are well-known and their number is small.
• If the key escrow database is compromised, the security is lost. Every
user of that key escrow authority can then be eavesdropped electronically.

• Users do not have confidence in these schemes because they are in
favour of law enforcement agencies at the price of sacrificing users'
right of privacy.
Hence, under existing schemes, users are completely unprotected from the
abuse of power by authorities or compromise of the security in the system
yet they have no other options but to faithfully and unconditionally trust
that the system will work properly for them.

3.2

Orwellian World

The government is powerful while the individual is weak. In its attempt
to ensure the safety of its citizens, the government can easily overstep the
privacy of the individuals. Increasingly more activities (political, social, cultural, financial) are occurring electronically, too much government control
can result serious erosion of the rights of privacy.
The following is an abstract taken from George Orwell's 1984 which depicted the horrible scene of complete intrusion of individual's privacy by the
government:
Outside,

even through the shut window-pane,

the world looked cold.

Down

in the street little eddies of wind were whirling dust and torn paper into
rals, and though the sun was shining and the sky a harsh blue, there
to be no colour in anything,
The black-moustachio'd

except the posters that were plastered

face gazed down from

There was one on the house-front

seemed

everywhere.

every commanding

immediately

opposite.

spi-

BIG

corner.
BROTHER

IS WATCHING

YOU, the caption said, while the dark eyes looked deep into

Winston's

Down

own.

at street level another

flapped fitfully

in the wind,

word INGSIC.

In the far distance

roofs, hovered for an instant
curving flight.

covering

a helicopter

like a bluebottle,

however.

back the voice from

pig-iron

and the overfulfilment

received

and transmitted

torn at one

and uncovering
skimmed

corner,

the

down between

of the Ninth

simultaneously.

the

into people's windows.

Only the Thought Police mattered.
the telescreen

single
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long as he remained within the field of vision which the metal plaque commanded, he could be seen as well as heard. There was of course no way of
knowing whether you were being watched at any given moment.

How often,

or on what system, the Thought Police plugged in on any individual wire was
guesswork. It was even conceivable that they watched everybody all the time.
But at any rate they could plug in your wire whenever they wanted to. You
had to live - did live, from habit that became instinct - in the assumption
that every sound you made was overheard, and, except in darkness,

every

movement scrutinized [34]This vision of a Big Brother government should serve as a warning to the
design and choice of any key escrow schemes.

3.3

Dilemma

Strong encryption enables absolute privacy of communication with the potential of denying legitimate government access. This is unprecedented and
not available in other areas of civilized lives, for example, one's speech is
subject to slander, libel, obscenity and other legal restraints. Human society
is based on an implicit social contract: individuals sacrifice absolute freedom
in exchange for an orderly society and limited freedom. One must protect
privacy as well as public safety and national security. Cryptography has upset the traditional balance of power between individuals and government. A
new balance must be sought to restore the status quo.
This involves balancing competing interests in a way that ensures effective
law enforcement and intelligence gathering, while protecting users' privacy.
To sum up this dilemma, Dorothy E. Denning wrote a letter [13] and it
is reproduced here as follows:
My position on encryption policy, April 2, 1997.
I do not know what is the best long-term U.S. or international policy regarding
encryption.

I recognize the need for encryption to protect information,

but I

also appreciate the adverse effects encryption can have on public safety, law
enforcement,

and national security.

I do not advocate domestic regulations mandating key recovery.

Neither

do I advocate that cryptography necessarily be free of all regulation, including
export controls.

I constantly struggle with the issues and do not see easy

answers. I believe that we should seriously discuss and evaluate a wide range
of options, and that our decisions should be as informed as possible.

There

may not be a single approach that is best in all contexts.
I believe that organizations and individuals should be able to use strong,
robust encryption.

I also believe that key recovery is good business policy.

I support the program of the Clinton Administration to liberalize export
controls for key recovery products, to adopt key recovery within federal agencies, and to promote key recovery technologies.

I believe that key

recovery

can be done without compromising privacy and security.
I support open, public discussions of encryption policy.

I also recognize

that pertinent information relating to national security, law enforcement,

and

proprietary interests will not be made public. Encryption policy must be based
on all available

information.

Dorothy E. Denning
This dilemma of electronic privacy versus lawful access by government
may in extreme cases create crypto anarchy or the Big Brother world. The
paramount question in this thesis is: is there a middle ground or compromise
between users and authorities that is mutually acceptable to and trusted by
both parties?

3.4

This Work

This thesis proposes an optimal solution to this intractable dilemma based
on the jury system and presents an improved key escrow scheme that is
acceptable to all parties. This scheme has the following properties:
• The government cannot embark upon mass wire-tapping.
• The number of trustees is so large that it is practically infeasible to
manipulate them.
• Even if the key escrow database is compromised, the escrowed keys are
still safe.
• Users' private keys are not handed over to the authorities prematurely
until they are actually alleged of committing a crime.

• This scheme provides a fair balance of power between users and authorities. It balances the user's right of privacy without sacrificing the
need for law enforcement.
These properties are achieved by retaining the bulk of the escrowed keys
in the hands of the users themselves (conceptually) until the moment they
are required for law enforcement purposes.

Chapter 4
Related Works
This chapter briefly reviews some of the related works. A taxonomy for key
escrow systems can also be found in [10]. Most of these schemes suffer from
the drawbacks as pointed out in section 3.1.

4.1

Escrowed Encryption Standard (EES)

After over twenty years of service, DES was believed to be close to the end
of its useful life. A stronger algorithm with longer key is needed to replace
DES. On April 16, 1993, the U.S. Government announced [33] a proposal for
a new federal standard encryption system with key escrow capability which
is called Escrowed Encryption Standard (EES) [23'.

4.1.1

Brief Description of EES

EES is a voluntary Federal standard for encryption of voice, fax and computer
information transmitted over circuit-switched telephone systems. It is based
on a tamperproof chip (also known as CHpper chip) which implements the
classified Skipjack encryption algorithm designed by the National Security
Agency (NSA). Skipjack is a symmetric block cipher with a key length of 80
bits which is much stronger than DES with 56 bits. Both the plaintext and
ciphertext lengths are 64 bits.
In EES, a user's Clipper chip key is escrowed with two government escrow
agents (namely, the National Institute of Standards and Technology and Automated Systems Division of the Treasury Department) and hence allows key
recovery by law enforcement authorities when served with a lawful warrant.
To identify the sender and receiver, a field, called Law Enforcement Agency

Field (LEAF) is attached to the ciphertext. An excellent account of EES can
be found in [IT

4.1.2

Operation

For two parties to communicate using EES, both parties must have a communication security device with a Clipper chip. Every chip will have its chip
identifier and key registered with the Federal government. Key registration
will occur during manufacturing process and NSA licences the manufacturers
of the chip. The protocol is as follows:
• The devices agree on an 80-bit session key separately (not included in
EES).
• Each device passes the session key to its Clipper chip.
• Clipper chip encrypts the session key with its chip key.
• The encrypted session key and the chip's 32-bit identifier together with
a 16-bit checksum are encrypted again by the family key known to the
government only and this forms the LEAF that is transmitted to the
other device.
• If the LEAF is valid, encrypted communications can begin.
Recovery by law enforcement agencies such as Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) is as follows:
• FBI intercepts the encrypted message.
• FBI extracts the LEAF from the header of the message.
• LEAF is decrypted by using the family key and the chip's identifier is
determined.
• Escrow agents return the two halves of the corresponding chip's key.
• The session key can be recovered by decrypting again with this chip
key.
• The plaintext can be recovered by decrypting with this session key.
Note that, once the chip key is obtained, all encrypted calls made using
this chip can be similarly decrypted without time-bound.

4.1.3

Criticism

Public response to EES has been overwhelmingly negative and it has sparked
off a lot of criticisms. Criticisms include:
• Skipjack algorithm is classified and not open to public scrutiny.
• Because Skipjack is designed by NSA (a military organization), there
is a suspicion that a backdoor might have been installed.
• EES requires inflexible and special tamper-proof hardware.
• User's secret keys are escrowed by government agencies and this allows
ease of collusion and unlawful wiretapping of private communications
of the users.
• There is fear that there will be a total ban by government in unescrowed
encryption systems.
• There is no self-escrow facility and hence it offers no benefit to the users
because users of lost key cannot use EES to recover their lost keys.
• Although the exact method of checksum is classified, the 16 bits checksum is too small to be secure against exhaustive search.
• Once an investigation is authorized by the court, the authority will be
able to decrypt every message transmitted by the suspect, without any
time-bound.
• Only information about a message sender is included in the LEAF. One
cannot trace the destination of a message.
• It requires a limited number of licensed EES manufacturers to produce
the Clipper chips and security is a problem.
• EES adds complexity and cost to the communication system.
• It is unlikely that foreign countries will adopt Clipper chip for secure
communications.
• Interoperability problem between two different systems requires dual
products to support domestic and overseas applications.

One security attack comes from the work of Blaze [5]. He pointed out that
it is possible for rogue applications to use the Skipjack algorithm integrated
inside a Clipper chip to do encryption/decryption without using the LEAF.
This technique replaces the LEAF containing the current session key by one
containing an unrelated key that allows one participant in a communication
to construct unilaterally a LEAF that denies law enforcement, but which will
be accepted as "valid" by a communicant using EES-compliant technology.
Some more technical criticisms can also be found in [24 .

4.1.4

Clipper II & III

In the Clipper chip II scheme, the U.S. government recognized the importance
of independent trustees and agreed to use trusted third parties ( T T P ) outside
the government to escrow users' private keys but still refused to unclassify
the Skipjack algorithm. However, Clipper II was soon replaced by a more
open and comprehensive proposal [32] in May 1996 which was soon dubbed
as "Clipper III".

4.2

Fair Public Key Cryptosystems

This is an important scheme which was proposed by Micali in 1992 [28j and
was partially adopted by Clipper III. In this scheme, there are a fixed number
of predesignated trustees and there exists an arbitrary number of users. A
user chooses his/her public and private key pair and then splits the private
key into pieces and gives each trustee one piece. Each trustee can individually
verify that the piece he/she received is indeed part of the private key without
combining the pieces. Unlike EES, there is no need for a tamperproof chip
and a classified algorithm. The scheme is based on pubhc key cryptosystems
and can be implemented in software alone.
The contribution of this paper includes:
• It introduces a software-based public-key key escrow scheme.
• This scheme is fairer to the users because it strikes a better balance of
power between users and authorities in comparison with EES.
• Different schemes for both RSA and Diffie-Hellman based systems are
proposed.

• It incorporates verifiable secret sharing protocol so that the user can
choose his/her key but he/she cannot cheat the trustees.
• It discusses algorithmic-chosen session key generation.
• It discusses time-bounded court-authorized eavesdropping.
However, this scheme suffers from the drawbacks mentioned in section
3.1. Later on, this thesis will show how to make this scheme democratic.

4.3

Encapsulated Key Escrow

This scheme [1] improves [28] and makes it possible for authorities to only
selectively wiretap a small number of individual users but makes it computationally prohibitive to launch large scale wiretapping. This is achieved by
imposing a computational time delay (or time capsule) between obtaining of
the escrowed information of a user and recovering the user's private key. The
time capsule can be set arbitrarily depending on the computational strength
of the authorities.
In this scheme, it is true that massive recovery of private keys by the
government is computationally hard, but some problems can still be noticed:
• There is no concrete construction of the time capsule function is given
and it is difficult to assess the strength of such a function.
• Even the time capsule can be found, it is difficult to set the time capsule
correctly because the government's computational strength is not static
but highly dynamic (e.g., due to technological breakthrough). This may
create worries and frequent re-escrowing by users.
• If the time capsule is set too high, it may create too much delay to the
law enforcement agencies to render it useless after the key is recovered.

4.4

Verifiable Partial Key Ecsrow

In this scheme [2] only part of the private key of a user is escrowed in a verifiable manner with the trustees of the government and it does not suffer from
early recovery attacks. Even if the government obtains legal authorization
for wiretapping the user and gets hold of the part of the private key which

was escrowed, it will still need to compute for a non-negligible but feasible
time, before it can recover the entire private key. This prevents the government from embarking upon large scale wiretapping. This scheme is similar
to [1] and shares similar problems with the other scheme.

4.5

A Proposed Architecture for Trusted Third
Party Services

This scheme [31] is adopted by the UK government for secure email and it is
based on Diffie-Hellman's key distribution protocol. It introduces a licensed
trusted third party (TTP) to escrow users' private keys.
In this scheme, consider a pair of users A and B where A wishes to send
B a confidential message and needs to be provided with a session key to
protect it. Suppose that A and B have associated different TTPs TA and
TB respectively. TA and TB need to agree on a number of parameters during
the setup phase.
Prior to any communication, A needs to generate the private send key
and obtain the public receive key for B and B needs to have the private
receive key. These keys are unique for each pair of participants A and B.
There are numerous problems with this scheme [30]. One serious problem
(Problem 6 on p.9) is that the compromise of the interoperability key between
the two domains will be catastrophic, as all traffic between users in those
domains will be vulnerable to attack.

4.6

Oblivious Key Escrow

In this scheme [6], the Internet as a whole acts as an escrow agent. This
is made possible by splitting the key into a very large number of shares
(e.g., 5000). These shares are then escrowed randomly by different sites
independently in such a manner that no one knows which sites are escrowing
whose keys. The trustees are very decentralised and their number is huge.
This scheme gets rid of many concerns associated with conventional schemes
but there are some problems :
• It is extremely inefficient and requires a lot of memory for a large-scale
system because each key has to be spht into a large number of shares.

• It is very chaotic and unreliable (e.g., the identities of shareholders are
not known).
• It is difficult for lawful recovery of the escrowed key (the author suggested pleading the case in television in order to convince these sites
to return their shares).
• It lacks structure and details for a serious implementation.
• It cannot prevent a malicious user from cheating by escrowing some
random bits rather than his/her true private key.

4.7

Translucent Cryptography

This scheme [3] offers an alternative to key escrow and does not require key
escrow trustees at all. It was proposed that a probability can be used as a
parameter such that a particular intercepted message can be decrypted by
law enforcement agencies with this probabiHty. However, it has two serious
disadvantages:
• Law enforcement may be frustrated because when it has an authorised
wiretap, it is not getting decryption of all the messages.
• Individuals may be frustrated that this scheme does not provide absolute privacy for their messages; law enforcement can read some fraction
of their messages.
Hence, this scheme should not be used for sending sensitive information.

4.8

Binding Cryptography

This scheme [20] is another alternative to key-escrow schemes and it allows
data recovery by law enforcement agencies as before. Data recovery is possible without the need to recover the private key. It avoids the need to escrow
the private key by the concept of "binding data". In this scheme, users'
messages should consist of the following fields:
• The intended message encrypted with a symmetric system by using a
session key.

• The session key encrypted by the public key of the receiver so that it
can be recovered by the receiver only.
• The session key encrypted by the public key of a trustee so that it can
be recovered by the trustee only.
It is essential to prove that the two encrypted fields correspond to the
same session key without disclosing it. An efficient implementation based on
ElGamal encryption scheme [19] is also proposed. In case of lawful data recovery, the trustee only needs to decrypt the session key with his/her private
key. In this manner, this scheme gets rid of the problem of escrowing user's
private key altogether. However, it shares the same problem with [31]: the
potential risk of compromising the trustee's key. In addition, the last field
is redundant and it is not necessary for secure communication between two
parties. Hence, it is difficult to enforce illegal users from omitting it unless
all communication providers cooperate to prevent this from happening.

4.9

A M a t t e r of Trust

The ultimate problem with existing key escrow schemes is a matter of trust.
Without user's trust, key escrow systems cannot become widespread as the
governments would Hke to see. The failure of Clipper chip initiative clearly
supports this point. Realising this problem of trust, governments now agree
to use T T P as escrow agents. While this is a drastic improvement in boosting
confidence among users, the revised schemes are still insecure, unfair and
undemocratic. The old problem remains: whom can the users trust? Can
they trust a handful of trustees appointed and regulated by the governments?
Perhaps, the real solution does not lie in inventing new cryptographic
technology alone but also in finding the new delicate balance point between
users' and authorities' rights which must be mutually trusted by both parties.
However, a measure of trust is something which is difficult to establish or to
maintain.
The jury system in common law has a high reputation of being impartial,
independent and representative. It has been implicitly trusted by individuals
and authorities alike as a tribunal for settling disputes over several hundreds
of years. The impHcit trust model in the jury system may have modern
relevance to key escrow scheme today.

Chapter 5
Jury System
The jury system provides impartial administration of justice to protect individuals' civil liberty.

It allows lay participation by individuals and this

can be used to express the community conscience through its members of
the jury. The concept of lay participation and community conscience is the
most crucial part of the jury system. This chapter briefly summarises the
development and features of the jury system and its similarities with the
counterparts in continental law. Most of the materials in this chapter can be
found in [9] and [18

5.1

Introduction

There are broadly two kinds of justice systems in criminal trials in the world :
common law system (also known as adversary system) and continental system
(also known as inquisitorial system). The former one is mainly practised by
English speaking countries such as Britain and USA while the latter is typical
of European countries such as France and Germany. The adversary system
relies mainly on oral argument and presentation while the inquisitorial system
concentrates more on written evidence. In both trial systems, a suspect is
assumed innocent until proven guilty.
Crime in the common law system can be classified into two types - summary offences and indictable ofl"ences.

The first category of offences are

mainly minor offences and not criminal in the full sense (e.g., driving offences which can be mostly settled by fines) so that it is not worthwhile to
undergo prolonged trial by jury. In case of indictable offences (e.g., murder
cases which normally impose severe imprisonment sentences), the accused
has a right to trial by jury. Trial by jury is of utmost importance in criminal

trial of common law system. It is conducted in a fashion similar to a contest
between prosecution and defence lawyers and the prosecution must prove to
the jury's satisfaction that the suspect is guilty beyond reasonable doubt.
The role of the judge is to act as an umpire in order to make sure both sides
act properly according to the prescribed rules.
The origins of trial by jury is deeply rooted in the political struggles of
medie\'al England. It is not what some lawgiver so decreed but evolved gradually over several hundreds years. By this system, twelve men and women
are selected at random from a large population of jurors chosen from the
common folks to form a jury in a criminal trial; they have never before had
any judicial experience. Their role is to judge the facts presented to them.
At the end of the case they will deliberate in order to arrive at a verdict of
whether the accused is guilty or not. The jury are free to reach whatever
verdict seems just, taking the case as a whole. It is not required that the
jurors have to understand all directions given by the judge; they deliberate
secretly; they need not give explanations for their verdict. They are therefore
free from strict application of the law to the facts and this gives them some
flexibility in applying the law.

5.2

Origin

Originally a juror was just a man who was compelled by the King to take
an oath in telling the truth. The Normans brought over this idea of jury
to Britain during the Norman Conquest.

Subsequently, the King used it

for obtaining information which he wanted to know about matters of local
administration. People living in the place where an inquiry was being held
were compelled to answer because they must know the local facts. Thus the
jury originated as a body of men used in an inquest decreed by the King. At
the beginning, the inquest was not related to the administration of justice.
Disputes were settled simply by one of the disputants proving himself by
some means to be the better man, e.g., trial by battle. However, trial by
ordeal was the most popular way to settle a dispute because people at that
time believed that it represented the divine acceptance of a claim by the
claimant.

5.3

Early History

A jury which gave the King information for administrative purposes was later
used by King Henry II to give information which would enable him to decide
a dispute. When a party got twelve oaths from the jury in his favour, he
won. This is the origin of the trial jury, of the rule that the trial jury consists
of twelve and of the rule that the verdict must be unanimous. Twelve was
chosen because it was thought to be large enough to create favourable opinion
of the side that won.
In November 1215 Pope Innocent III prohibited trial by ordeal which was
practised in criminal trials for more than fifty years because it was thought
to be too cruel. As a result, new ways must be invented and it was at this
moment that judges started to use the jury for criminal trials. Gradually, the
role of jury changed from providing local knowledge in an inquest to the sole
adjudicators of facts in modern jury system. This was due to the fact that
courts in feudal society required local knowledge of jurors for the settlement
of disputes. Due urbanization, this was no longer possible. Jurors, instead
of deciding the case on what they themselves knew, rehed on the submitted
evidence provided by both parties to reach the verdict.
Bushells Case in 1670 was a landmark in the history of jury system because it ended the judge's power to force juries to convict a suspect, by
threatening to punish them if they did not comply. In that case, the Quakes,
Penn and Mead, were set free by the jury of participating in an unlawful
assembly and the trial judge subsequently put the jury in jail. However, the
whole body of judges gathered together and concluded that as a matter of
law the trial judge did not have any power to do this. The case is often hailed
as a triumph for the independence of juries.

5.4

Characteristics

The following are the main characteristics of the jury system:
• The composition of jurors should be representative of the community
at large.
• The juror represents the reasonable man or the man in the street.
• The juror should be a freeman. Most civil servants are exempt from
jury service.

• The jurors are not responsible for anything said or done in carrying out
of their duty.
• The jury is the sole judge of facts.
• Twelve jurors are randomly selected from the juror population to form
a jury in a criminal trial.
• The jury has only to return yes or no without any need to give any
reasons.
• In most cases, ten-to-two majority verdict is sufficient. In rare cases,
unanimity is required.

5.5

Selection Procedure

The selection of a jury is done in two stages. The first stage is the selection of
a small subset of jurors from the juror population by the sheriff. The second
stage is the selection of twelve jurors from the subset to form the jury and
that is done by the clerk of the court randomly. A juror can be challenged
either peremptorily or for cause. The peremptory challenge is the one for
which no reason need to be assigned and the number is now limited to seven.
The party challenging for cause must show grounds to support the challenge.
The challenged juror cannot serve in that trial and must be replaced by other
jurors.

5.6

Merits

The Jury system presents an image of independence, impartiality and representativeness.

The jurors are selected randomly from citizens who have

no conflict of interest in the case, their judgement is unbiased by the legal
and administrative bureaucracy (e.g., courts and police). Thus, it convinces
members of society to accept the impartial nature of the judicial institutions.
In summary, the merits are :
• The jurors prevent collusion between judges and the police, and prevent
police influence in the courts from becoming dominant.

• The jurors prevent private citizens from exerting improper influence
over judges (e.g., by bribery).
• The jurors prevent the state from manipulating justice to curb its political opponents.
• The jurors prevent unjustifiable prosecutions and safeguard against repugnant laws which are harsh and oppressive.
• The jurors act as adjudicators whose view and experience will be those
of the man-in-the-street.
• The jurors are free from prejudice of professional judges and prevent
judges from imposing the views from their social class.
• The jurors ensure the independence and quality of the judges.
• The jury system educates the jurors with a sense of fairness and propriety of the judicial processes.
In 1768, William Blackstone enshrined the jury as the palladium, the
bulwark of liberty [4]. In USA and Canada, the jury system is generally
acclaimed as a fundamental guarantee of individual liberty.

Trial by jury

is therefore enshrined as a constitutional right (the Six Amendment of U.S.
Constitution and the Canadian Bill of Rights).

5.7

Trials in Continental Law

Many countries practising continental law employ a system in which judges
and laymen sit together as a combined bench to decide a criminal case. Below
are just a few examples:
• France : seven laymen (also called jurors) are required to sit together
with three judges as one bench to decide questions of guilt and punishment jointly.
• Germany : a court of six lay members and three judges is established
to try the most serious criminal offences, and for the medium-range
offences a smaller version comprising one judge and two laymen is created.

• Sweden : in serious crime, a professional judge and from seven to nine
lay members known as "namndeman" form a panel. These are drawn
from a large body of local citizens chosen for their position of responsibility and their record of service in the community. The judge acts
as chairman and his/her vote is given special weight. A case can only
go against his/her opinion if at least seven of the lay members decide
it the other way. For the middle range of crimes, a judge and three
namndeman is used.
Here the judge has greater influence over the lay members by taking part
in the joint deliberations (in common law, jury deliberates alone). However,
the judge has to justify his/her opinion to the laymen, for they in the end
have the power to outvote him. Thus, the presence of lay judges, being totally
independent, offers advantages similar to the common law's jury system.

5.8

Bulwark of Civil Liberty

The jury system is often hailed as the bulwark of civil Hberty. Below are just
a few famous quotations from legal sources to support this view:
• no free man shall be taken and imprisoned or disseised of any free
tenement

or of his liberties or free customs or outlawed or exiled, or

in any other way destroyed, nor will we go upon nor send upon him,
except by the lawful judgment of his peers or by the law of the land [8].
• The first object of any tyrant in Whithall would be to make
utterly subservient

Parliament

to his will; and the next to overthrow or diminish

trial by jury, for no tyrant could afford to leave a subject^s freedom in the
hands of twelve of his country-men.
an instrument

So that trial by jury is more than

of justice and more than one wheel of the

constitution:

it is the lamp that shows that freedom lives [15].
• What makes juries worthwhile is that they see things differently
the judges,

that they can water the law, and that function

from

which they

filled two centuries ago as a corrective to the corruption and partiality
of the judges requires essentially the same qualities as the function
perform today as an organ of the disestablishment
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Chapter 6
Democratic Key Escrow
Schemes
In the following, this thesis proposes a new approach to key escrow by the
introduction of "electronic jury system".

6.1

Electronic Jury System

The jury system represents the middle ground or compromise in the traditional balance of power between individuals and the government and this
trusted compromise is exactly what is lacking in the existing key escrow systems. The implicit trust model can be borrowed and applied in this new
situation of key escrow system.

6.1.1

New Mechanism

The proposed electronic jury system is a new mechanism to achieve proper
balance of power in the new era of information revolution by distributing the
escrowed key shares to users who are members of the electronic jury rather
than the authorities. The selection of electronic jurors and electronic jury
must be fair and seen to be fair. Each escrowed key is kept collectively by the
electronic jury using a secret sharing scheme [38]. The specific combination of
the electronic jury should be kept secret and known to the authorities alone.
In the case of an alleged crime, the authorities will request the electronic
jury to return their shares of the suspect's private key in order to recover
his/her private key. Optionally, it may be required that the authorities have
to submit the case to the electronic jury and to convince them for the return

of their shares. Each electronic juror may decide individually or together. If
the number of shares exceed the threshold, the authorities can recover the
private key and decrypt the necessary information.
One distinct advantage of this scheme is that it allows a better international agreement in establishing a global key escrow infrastructure because
there is a common thread in using laymen in the judicial process in both
common law and continental law.
In the remaining parts of the thesis, jury/juror are not distinguished from
electronic jury/juror. This can be easily understood from the context.

6.1.2

A b s t r a c t Model for Electronic J u r y System

Based on the traditional jury system, the following abstract model can be
established:
• The jurors must be chosen fairly from the users to form the juror population.
• The juror population must be large enough to prevent possible manipulation of jurors.
• A jury consisting of a small number of jurors (say seven) must be
randomly selected from the juror population by escrow authority.
• Each user's private key is then shared among the jurors in the jury.
• Each user should not know his/her jury to prevent collusion.
• Each juror must not know the user for the same reason.
• The actual secret key shares must not be known to escrow authority to
prevent compromise or abuse by authorities.
• The list of jury population must be public to foster openness and trust.
• The key escrow information (the mapping of users to juries) is known
to the escrow authority only in order to allow lawful recovery of private
keys.
Optionally, jury can be used to evaluate police's request (e.g., by requiring
a brief summary of the case) and vote by returning/not returning individual
shares.

Further benefits are the same as traditional jury system mentioned in
Section 10.6.

6.2

System Description

A key escrow scheme is democratic if it employs the above electronic jury
system as key escrow trustees. It is democratic because the traditional jury
system is one of the cornerstones of modern democracy.
This section shows how to design democratic key escrow schemes. Three
different schemes are then proposed in the following three sections.

Each

scheme prevents a. user from cheating: that is escrowing some random bits
rather than his/her true private key. The first one attempts to solve this
problem by using a tamperproof smart card while the second and third ones
do the same but eliminate the need for special hardware and can be fully
implemented in software.

6.2.1

Entities

The system consists of the following entities:
• User: the user wants to (or is required to) escrow his/her private key.
• Escrow authority (EA): EA stores the information about each user's
private key but does not actually store the private key. Instead, EA
only needs to know the jury who actually hold the shares of a given
user.
• Certification Authority (CA): CA signs user's public key and binds
user's identity to his/her public key. To obtain such a certificate, the
user needs to escrow his/her private key with EA beforehand.
• Legal authority (LA): LA is responsible for registration, selection and
maintenance of juror population. LA is also responsible for recovering
user's private key.
• Law enforcement authority (LEA): LEA wants to wire-tap a suspect's
encrypted message. LEA will need to seek help from LA.
• Juror: a juror is selected from the pool of users themselves according
to some known criteria. Each juror independently escrows user's shares

of his/her private key. The juror population is publicly known and the
population size is large.
• Jury: a jury is a b o d y of jurors (say 7 members) randomly selected
from the juror population. Each jury is responsible for escrowing one
private key according to a secret sharing scheme.

6.2.2

Requirements

A democratic scheme must have the following properties:
1. It must allow the user to securely choose his/her private key.
2. EA must be convinced that the escrowed private key is correct and not
just some random bits: yet. EA cannot learn anything about the private
key.

EA also hats to ensure that the escrowed private key correctly

matches user's public key.
3. User must be prevented from learning who his/her jurors are and the
jurors must not learn who the user is.
The first property prevents the authorities from selecting a weak key for
the user.
The second property requires either employing a tamperproof smart card,
a verifiable secret sharing scheme or a "cut-and-choose" protocol to be discussed below.
The third property can be achieved by dis-allowing direct communications
between the user and the jury so that all communications are routed through
E A . However. EA w^ill then know the private key too.

One solution is to

allow each juror to send an encryption key to the user through EA so that
the user can encrypt his/her share with this key for this juror. This share
is then forwarded to the juror through EA and the juror can then decrypt
the message with his/her secret decryption key to recover the share. By this
way, the user can send the shares to the jurors securely without EA learning
the escrowed key. However, EA can cheat by secretly creating a pair of keys
itself.

EA then gives one of them to the user and pretends that the key

comes from the juror.

User will then encrypt juror's share using this key.

This enables EA to recover user's secret key easily after obtaining enough
shares. This can be prevented by allowing the user to challenge the jury. A

challenged jury will be opened by EA and become known to the user and
the user can then check with the jury whether EA has cheated by verifying
the encryption key. The challenged jury will then be replaced by a new one
by repeating the key registration scheme again. More information about the
security of this mechanism can be found in 4 of section 7.2.
It is assumed that all communication channels are secure. This may be
easily achieved by sharing a secret key in advance by the participants who
need to communicate directly.

6.3

Scheme 1

This scheme employs a tamperproof smart card for secure key generation
and storage to prevent the user from cheating. It presumes the availabihty
of such a trusted hardware device with some cryptographic capabilities.

6.3.1

Key Registration

Let M be the number of jurors in each jury per user.
1. User requests key escrow service from EA.
2. While User is not satisfied with the jurors selected by EA, repeat the
following steps:
3. EA randomly selects M jurors from the juror population provided by
LA to form a jury.
4. EA calls the M selected jurors.
5. Each juror 2, z = 1 , . . . , M", does the following:
• Generates two primes pi^ Qi and computes a modulus ni = p^ * qi.
• Chooses Ki^i,K2,i such that:
Ki^i * 1x2,i = 1 mod [pi -

- 1).

• Sends Ki^i,ni to EA but keeps pi^qi secret.
6. EA sends all

. . . , KI^MI ^i, • • •, '^m to User.

7. User challenges the jury or exits the while loop from here if he/she
accepts this jury selected by EA to escrow his/her shares.

8. EA opens the jury to User and public.
9. User checks that

is indeed sent by juror i.

10. End of while loop
11. User's smart card generates one key pair {pk,sk) for RSA.
12. EA randomly generates a mask m which is a random number used to
hide the private key of the user.
13. EA does the following:
• Notifies the user to insert the smart card.
• Authenticates user's smart card and verifies the key pair is correct.
• Sends all

. . . , KI^M, ^i, • • •, ^M and m to the smart card.

14. The smart card does the following:
• XORs sk with m to produce skm. That is, skm = sk
• Splits skm into M shares SI,....SM

m.

using Shamir's threshold

scheme. The share Si is intended for juror i.
• Encrypts each share of skm for the juror i with his/her corresponding Ki^i. Let the result be denoted by S^. That is,
EK,..

is.).

• Sends 5 i , . . . , SM to EA.
15. EA sends 5 i , . . . , SM to the jurors 1,. •., M .
16. Juror i does the following:
• Decrypts Si with /\2,i to recover his/her share. That is,
== DK2,^ (Si).
• Stores his/her share.
17. EA accepts the registration.
18. CA publishes the user's pk.

=

6.3.2

Key Recovery for Law Enforcement

1. LEA presents the case to LA.
2. LA assesses any prima facie evidence to proceed or reject the claim.
3. Should the case be accepted, LA will notify the jury through EA. EA
will also send the mask m to LA.
4. Each juror i returns his/her share Si to LA.
5. If the number of received shares exceeds the threshold, LA can recover
the XORed private key skm.
6. LA XORs the mask m to recover the private key sk.
The shares are returned directly to LA in order to prevent EA from knowing
the private key of the suspect (EA does not need it).

6.3.3

Efficiency Consideration

This scheme requires a lot of computations but they are distributed in such
a way that makes it feasible in practice. Below is a breakdown of the computation for each party :
• User's smart card needs to prepare one key pair, XORs the private
key with the mask and splits the result into M shares. It also has to
encrypt M times using jurors' keys. User then only has to wait for
EA's notice for acceptance. Typically, M is a small integer (say 7).
Computation is not excessive because a user needs to register his/her
private key occasionally and non-interactively. Hence, efficiency is not
a critical issue.
• EA needs to generate one mask. Also, EA needs to save user's information including one mask and the jury information for each user. Given
that EA is a dedicated organization, this is not excessive either.
• LA has to recover the private key in case of law enforcement.
Each juror needs to generate 2 keys for communication and decrypts
once to recover the share. Also, he/she has to save only one share per
user. This is considered acceptable because it does not occupy a lot of
jury's computing time and memory.

Unlike Clipper chip, the key pair is generated by the smart card and not
embedded during manufacturing. However, the security of this scheme still
heavily depends on the security of the smart card itself.
However, a software solution offers a flexibility and versatility that hardware does not have. A family of compatible products is an excellent way
to sell new technology. Vendors will often offer capability of beginning with
low-cost software, with the option of upgrading to higher-performance and
more expensive hardware when needed.
A software solution that prevents the user from cheating without resorting
to a smart card is as follows.

6.4

Scheme 2

6.4.1

Key Registration

This is based on the subset method for RSA in [28] (p. 127^128). In the subset
method, the set of trustees is divided into different subsets such that each
subset has a unique composition. The same secret is then shared repeatedly
among trustees in the subset. To recover the secret, it is sufficient to have
all shares of only any one subset.

Similarly, M jurors are first randomly

selected by the EA to form a jury. The user's private key is then repeatedly
shared among different subsets of the same jury. To recover the private key.
LA needs to have all shares of any one subset from the jury. Consider the
following parameters for secret sharing: n = M, T = t + 1.
1. User requests key escrow service from EA.
2. Go through the jury challenge protocol in step 2 to 10 of section 6.3.1
in scheme 1.
3. User does the following:
• Chooses two primes p and q congruent to 3 mod 4 as his/her
private key, and computes n = p * q.
• Generates all T-subsets of the jury consisting of M selected jurors,
where a subset is represented by a T-tuple J^ = (Ji,....

Jj) and

J i , . . . , JT represent different jurors from the chosen jury. There
are C^^ such subsets.
following steps.

For each tuple J^, the user repeats the

Chooses randomly T Jacobi symbol + 1 integers Xi,^,... ,XT,S in
Z*, where Z* is the multiplicative group of the integers between
1 and n which are relatively prime to n.
Computes the following:
- Xs = Xi^s * ... * Xt,s TTiod n.
-

=

* Xk,s rnod n foT k =

1,...

- Zs = X^^^ * ... * X^^^ mod n.

Note that Zs itself is a square. One square root of Zs mod n
is Xs which has Jacobi symbol +1.
- Computes Ys, which is one of the Jacobi symbol - 1 roots
mod n of
.. •,
^ will be the public pieces and
Xi^s, • •.
will be the corresponding private pieces.
• To each juror A; in J^, sends the private piece Xk,s and n through
EA as in scheme 1.
• Sends EA the value of Ys and n.
4. Juror k in J^ does the following:
• Checks that Xk,s has Jacobi symbol +1.
• Computes X^^^ = Xk,s *

T^od n.

• Sends X l ^ to EA.
• Stores Xk,s5. EA does the following:
• Checks whether Y^ mod n = X^^^ * ... *
mod n. In this way,
it is possible to verify whether the user has cheated.
• Checks whether n is in fact a product of 2 prime numbers.
• Stores the user and jury information, Ys and n.
• Accepts the registration (e.g., by notifying CA and jury).
6. CA publishes the user's pk.

6.4.2

Key Recovery for Law Enforcement

1. LEA presents the case to LA.
2. LA assesses any prima facie evidence to proceed or reject.
3. Should the case be accepted, LA will notify the jury through EA.
4. EA returns Ys and n to LA.
5. Each juror returns his/her all Xi^s to LA.
6. If LA receives all T values of Xi^s in at least one tuple J^, LA then
computes the product of the received pieces to obtain Xs-

Knowing

Xs, Ys and n, it is easy to factorise n ([36]) and to recover the private
key.

6.4.3

Efficiency Consideration

In this scheme, the user has to generate one key pair but he/she has to split
repeatedly this single private key into T shares for all possible combinations
of subsets in the same chosen jury (total C^ ways). He/she has to generate T
Jacobi symbol +1 integers and to compute Zs and its square root Ys of Jacobi
symbol -1 for each subset. Computation by EA involves simple verification
and factorization procedures. For the jurors, computation is trivial but the
memory requirement is higher. Instead of escrowing one share per user, each
juror has to escrow

shares per user because each juror belongs to

subsets of the same jury in the secret sharing scheme. Since M and T are
typically small values (say 7 and 4) and each juror escrows only a few users
(say 10), it is believed that this is still acceptable.

6.5

Scheme 3

In this scheme, a user can be prevented from cheating by using the "cut and
choose" protocol ( [35]). Here the user arbitrarily generates many private
and public key pairs (e.g., 100 pairs) and sends shares of each of them to the
juries according some secret sharing schemes (see [40]). EA then opens all
except one and verifies that they are all correct. The remaining unopened
private key is taken to be correct and will be actually used by the user and

to be escrowed by the jurors.

If the number of key pairs is large and the

penalty for cheating is high, it is in the user's interest not to cheat.

6.5.1

Key Registration

Let N be the number of key pairs generated by the user in the "cut and
choose" protocol.
1. User requests key escrow service from EA.
2. Go through the jury challenge protocol in step 2 to 10 of section 6.3.1
in scheme 1.
3. EA generates N masks rrij, ioi j = I,...

,N.

Each mask is a random

number which is used to hide the private key of a user.
4. EA sends the N masks to the user.
5. User does the following :
• Creates N pairs of RSA public and private keys {pkj.skj),
3 =

for

1,...,N.

• XORs each skj with the mask mj. Let the result be skruj. Thus,
skrrij = skj ® rrij.
• Splits each skrrij into M shares, sij,...,

SMJ- The share si^j is

intended for juror i.
• Collects the shares of all skrrij intended for juror i, encrypts
it with public key Ki^i (let's call the result 5i).That is, Si

• Sends

. . . , 5m and p/ci,...,pkjsf to EA.

6. EA does the following :
• Generates a random number r between 1 and N.
• Sends Si,...,

SM and r to juries 1 , . . . , M.

7. Each juror i does the following :
• Decrypts Si with A'2,,- to recover the N shares. That is,
..
=
[Si]'

=

• Sends back the N - 1 shares, except

to EA.

8. EA does the following :
• Recovers the A^ — 1 skm^s. Each skrrij can be recovered from
shares

SI^,...

.SMJ-

• XORs each with its mask. That is, skj = skrrij © rrij . In this
way, skj except skr can be recovered.
• Verifies that all recovered N—1 pairs of {pki.ski),...,

{pk^, skjv),

excluding {pkr,skr), are all correct.
• Stores the user information, the jury Hst and the remaining mask
rrir securely.
• Accepts the registration (e.g., by notifying CA and the jurors).
The corresponding public key will be pkr.
9. CA publishes the user's pkr.
10. Jurors 1 , . . . , M, securely store the remaining shares

• • •, «SM,r- These

shares are used to recover skr, if necessary.

6.5.2

Key Recovery for Law Enforcement

1. LEA presents the case to the legal authorities.
2. LA assesses any prima facie evidence to proceed or reject the claim.
3. Should the case be accepted, LA will notify the jurors through EA. EA
will also send the mask rur to LA.
4. Each juror i returns his/her share Si^r to LA.
5. If the total number of shares exceeds the threshold, LA can recover the
XORed private key skrrir.
6. LA XORs the mask m^ to recover the private key skr.

6.5.3

Efficiency Consideration

This scheme is very simple but computationally most inefficient. Below is a
breakdown of the computation for each party :
• Each user needs to prepare N key pairs, XORs each private key with the
mask and splits the result to M shares. He/she also has to encrypt M
times using jurors' keys. He/she then only has to wait for EA's notice
for which one key pair to use. Depending on the speed of his/her CPU
and values of M and iV, this is not excessive because a user needs to
register his/her private key occasionally and non-interactively. Hence,
efficiency is not a critical issue.
EA needs to generate N masks, encrypt M times using jurors' keys,
recover A^ — 1 keys and verify that they are correct key pairs. Also, EA
needs to save user's information including one mask and the jury list
for each user. Given that EA is a dedicated organization, this is not
excessive either.
• LEA has to recover the private key in case of law enforcement.
• Each juror needs only to generate two keys for communication and
decrypt once to recover the shares. Also, he/she has to save only one
share per user. This is considered acceptable because it does not occupy
a lot of jury's computing time and memory.

Chapter 7
Security Analysis
This chapter evaluates the strengths and possible attacks of the three proposed democratic key escrow schemes. Some counter-measures are proposed
to prevent or minimize these attacks.

7.1

Strengths

The three proposed schemes provide better protection of privacy from abuse
of power and collusion of different parties. This section gives a brief summary
of the strengths in these schemes and they are as follows:
1. These schemes can be easily understood by all parties because they are
very similar to the well established jury system.
2. Shares are stored independently by each juror.

This is democratic

because the escrowed key is conceptually in the hands of user's peers
(though randomly and in a scrambled way). Key recovery is possible
only at the moment of suspected crime. This is fairer to the users and
matches our perception of democracy.
3. Jurors can stay offline until EA requests key registration service. Jurors
can also stay offline after storing the shares until notified by LA to
• return their shares.
4. Government cannot embark upon a mass wire-tapping because the keys
are completely decentralized. Should the government become malicious
(e.g., due to sudden change of government), all jurors just delete their
shares!!

5. Even if EA's database is compromised, the private keys cannot be recovered because the shares are not stored in EA's database.
6. Using jurors' keys to forward shares from user to jury through EA,
jurors cannot learn who the user is and the user cannot learn who the
jurors are because they only deal with EA. Thus, it is very difficult for
the user to prevent (by bribe, threat, etc) the jurors from returning
their shares.
7. Even if all jurors in a jury collude together, the private key cannot be
recovered without the mask kept by EA in schemes 1 & 3. In scheme 2,
one private key may be compromised but the bulk of private keys are
still secure. Also, if the jurors do not know among themselves before
key recovery, it is infeasible for them to collude.
8. In scheme 3, using "cut and choose" protocol, the user can cheat only 1
in N cases. By making N sufficiently large and the penalty for cheating
sufficiently high, the chance of cheating is minimal.
9. The threshold can be adjusted according to the society's need and/or
applications. For example, the Parliament can renew and adjust the
threshold level annually after review in order to balance the protection
of privacy and the need for law enforcement. If the government becomes
too aggressive or it is too difficult for LEA to recover the private key,
the threshold can be adjusted accordingly.
10. The private key is chosen by the user. This prevents authorities from
using weak keys to facilitate wire-tapping.
11. Separation of duty between EA and LA provides the required check and
balance of power. LA is responsible for the juror population but the
jury for each user is chosen by EA. Neither LA nor EA can manipulate
the jury.
12. These schemes provide better opportunity to obtain international agreements because the electronic jury system is an independent and impartial system similar to the judicial trial systems both in common law
and continental law.

7,2

Possible Attacks

This section explores some possible attacks to these schemes and explains
how they can be avoided or minimized. These attacks are:
1. In scheme 2, assume LA is corrupt. Instead of admitting jurors fairly,
LA systematically admits jurors who collude with LA. Some safeguard
can be provided by disqualifying certain classes of people (e.g., civil
servants, etc) but still cannot prevent a malicious LA from doing this.
This problem can be better dealt with by estabHshing a special committee to guarantee that fair selection procedures are observed.
2. EA selects (not randomly) specific subsets of the jurors from the juror
population provided by LA. A malicious government can then force
them to hand over their shares, the private key can then be recovered.
However, this scenario is extremely unlikely. Also, the same committee can check that EA indeed randomly selects the jury by periodic
inspection.
3. Consider the case that the government is only interested to recover a
small set of private keys from the whole set of users. EA can provide
the required juries to the government and the government can then
force the juries to give up their shares to the government to enable
wire-tapping. Even if this were true, the bulk of private keys remain
secure.

Again this is highly unlikely.

This situation can be largely

avoided by requiring EA to be an independent third party.
4. As mentioned in 6.2.2, EA can cheat by secretly creating a pair of keys
itself. EA then gives one of them to the user and pretends that the key
comes from juror i. User will then encrypt juror z's share using this
key. This enables EA to recover user's secret key easily after obtaining
enough shares. This can be prevented by allowing the user to challenge
the jury. A challenged jury will be exposed to the user and the user
can then check with the jury whether EA has cheated by verifying the
encryption key. The challenged jury will then be replaced by a new one
by repeating the key registration scheme again. This challenge protocol
can be repeated until the user is satisfied that EA has not cheated
(different users may have different needs). The probability that EA can
cheat after N rounds is (1/2)^"^ and can be theoretically made as small

as possible but practical consideration limits the number of rounds to
a small value (In fact, it is also feasible perform the challenge protocol
in parellel rather than in series). Of course, as EA is assumed to be
an independent third party, EA can be heavily penalized if it is caught
in cheating (by law or by market force). Also, if EA is dishonest, it
can be easily discovered because it has to register many users and any
one of them can reveal EA's dishonesty. The opened jurors can also
be used to indicate whether ExA has fairly selected jurors because this
information can be made public (unless EA can collude with a large
number of jurors).
5. In scheme 3, each juror cannot verify his/her share is correct and not
just random bits, so there is always a chance one in N that the user
can cheat.
6. It might be possible that the number of shares returned is not enough
to recover the private key even there is a genuine need by LEA. This is
also true in our jury system where a criminal is walked free. Of course,
it is possible to require the jurors for the mandatory return of their
shares if their sole responsibility is to escrow user's shares.

7.3

Subliminal Channel

The notion of subliminal channel was first introduced by Simmons in his
Prisoners' problem [39]. Basically, a subliminal channel (or covert channel)
is a covert communication channel that cannot be read by those for whom it
is not intended.
It was pointed out [27] that an attacker can set up a covert channel (or
shadow public key cryptosystem) by choosing his/her key pair in the following
manner.
Instead of generating a key pair (P, S) as normal, the dishonest user
generates two key pairs (P, 5 ) and ( P ' , 5 ' ) , where (P, 5 ) is a proper public
and private key pair. {P',S')

is a shadow key pair and P' = f(P)

where

/ is an easily computed and publicly known function. The attacker uses
(P, S) in the same way as would an ordinary user, but keeps S' reserved as
his/her shadow secret key. In order for someone to send a secret message
through this covert channel without the fear of being wiretapped, the sender

computes P' = f{P) and then encrypts the message using P'. The receiver
of the message then decrypts it using S'. In an attack for RSA cryptosystem
21], the attacker does the following:
• Generates primes p > p' and q> q'.
• Computes n = p^ q and n' = p' ^ q'.
• Sets Ke = n'
• Finds Kd such that K^ ^ Kd = I mod {p • Sets K'^ = {n mod n') — {n mod

- 1).

Ke).

• Finds K'd such that K'^ ^ K'd = I mod {p' - l){q' - 1).
• Hands over p, q, n, Ke, Kd to EA but keeps p', q' secret.
The accomplices of the attacker encrypt a message m using K'^^n' derived
from Ke,n which can be obtained from a CA legitimately The attacker can
decrypt it by K'd. In this way, the attacker can escrow his/her private key
and yet the authorities cannot decrypt the actual messages sent by his/her
accomplices.
Five properties are stipulated to provide a failsafe key escrow system:
• Each user can be sure that the secret key is chosen securely, even if all
the trustees and central authorities are malicious.
• The central authority will be guaranteed that the secret key for each
user is chosen securely even if the user does not have access to a good
random generator.
• Each user will be guaranteed that his/her secret key will remain secret
unless a sufficient number of trustees release their shares of the key to
the central authority.
• The central authority is guaranteed to be able to recover the escrowed
key if necessary.
• The subliminal channel is avoided.

It is noted that one way to meet the above criteria is to require the
key generation to be through the collaboration of the user and the EA. For
simplicity, this thesis does not include this scenario in the above schemes.
However, it is not difficult to extend the schemes to prevent this type of
attack. For example, instead of letting a user to randomly choose his/her
public key, EA can select a prime number as the user's public key. The user
then generates two primes p, q as before and calculates the corresponding
private key secretly. As the public key is a prime number, it is relatively
prime to {p — l){q — 1) so that a unique private key exists. In this way, it is
impossible for the attacker to set Kg = n' = p' ^ q' because Ke is now prime.
Also, by selecting the public key for the user, EA has no way of learning
the user's private key as long as it does not know p and q. In this way, the
problem of subliminal channel can be avoided.

Chapter 8
Practical Consideration
This chapter explores some practical issues which need to be considered.

8,1

Key Recovery

Key recovery is often more urgent. By properly selecting the jury and setting
the threshold value for secret sharing of the private key, the process of key
recovery can be made faster for law enforcement purposes. For example, it
might be acceptable to have 7 jurors to form a jury and requires agreement
of any 4 to recover an escrowed key. Also, jurors' shares can be stored in
some portable device such as a mobile phone or an electronic wallet in order
to facilitate urgent recovery.

8.2

Selection Criteria of Jurors

Ideally, every responsible user can be a juror. However, it is recommended
to have a stricter criteria first and then gradually relax the requirement to
allow more users to become jurors. The following are just a few guidelines :
• Jurors should be professionals with high personal integrity (e.g., lecturers, doctors, accountants, etc).
• Jurors must have good character (e.g., no previous criminal records).
• Jurors must not be civil servants (e.g., policeman).

8.3

Key Renewal

It should be possible for a user to periodically renew his/her escrowed key.
A user who feels threatened can change his/her private key more frequently
while others can stick to the same private key for a long time.

8.4

Share Transfer

For some reasons, it is necessary to transfer jury's shares (e.g. if he/she is
retired). This can be easily performed without key re-registration by the user
through the following steps:
• EA selects a new juror.
• The new juror generates 2 keys using public key cryptography and
distributes them in the same way as in step 14 of section 6.3.1 in scheme
1.

• The old juror .sends his/her shares to the new juror through EA as
before.
• The new juror recovers the shares.

8.5

Implementation

One possibility is to modify existing PGP software to incorporate a new
escrow key ring for each juror. This requires the establishment of a key escrow
agent(s). Thus, if a user wants to register his/her public key in the public key
server, he/she has to escrow his/her private key with the key escrow agent
beforehand. This thesis has implemented scheme 3 as a prototype and the
source code in Java language is available in Appendix.

8.6

Wider Applications

The proposed schemes can shed light into the possibility of having a net
criminal trial. Suppose the future net police arrests a net suspect who has
allegedly committed a net crime with net evidence only (not impossible in
the near future). The net suspect is notified and he/she can elect either to

have a traditional jury trial or a net jury trial. If he/she elects the latter,
the net court will conduct a net trial. The net judge will call for both net
prosecutor and net defence lawyer to submit net evidence. A panel of net
jurors is summoned to give a net verdict. This idea may sound like a science
fiction now but only time will tell.

Chapter 9
Conclusion
Advances in cryptography has created an opportunity to effectively use the
power of the new emerging Information Superhighway.

However, govern-

ments are hastily rushing through legislation to implement undemocratic
key escrow schemes in order to regulate these fast growing electronic media.
However, as pointed out in this thesis, these systems are insecure, unfair and
undemocratic. Perhaps, eventually, one cannot escape from having some kind
of key escrow system because not all individuals cannot be fully trusted. On
the other hand, individuals cannot unconditionally trust authorities either.
This thesis believes that the proposed democratic key escrow schemes can
offer a democratic, practical and socially acceptable solution to this problem.
It is hoped that these schemes can be a starting point for further research in
this direction.

Appendix A
Source Code for
Implementation of Scheme 3

INTRODUCTION
This appendix includes details of a prototype implementation for Scheme 3 as oudined in
page 43. The prototype serves as a proof of the concept and requires further enhancement
to become a realistic application. For simplicity, the following assumptions are made:
1. Only one user is considered;
2. All jurors are online;
3. Small key values are used(both p and q are smaller than MAX which is set to
1000);
4. The number of jurors in one jury is set to 5 only;
5. Any 3 of jurors in one jury can recover user's private key;
6. In the cut-and-choose protocol, only 10 key pairs are generated;
7. All jurors return their shares to LEA without deliberation;
8. Key recovery is set at shares 1,3 and 5 in the program;
9. No consideration is given to multi-threading of server and synchronization of
methods when accessing common data;
10. No detection of deadlock situation is considered;
11. No optimization of data structures is provided;
12. No optimization of message size is considered when a message is sent across
the network;
13. Some servers' hosts and ports are set in die program;
14. No error recovery procedures are included;
15. Jury registration is not included;
16. Assume all communication channels are secure.
The prototype consists of EA, LA and 10 juror servers and user and LEA clients
that are implemented in Java language of version 1.0. All the servers must run
simultaneously but the user client is needed only m key registration phase and LEA client is
needed only in key recovery phase.
In order to represent all entities effectively, an Entity class is defined. This class can be
used to create objects for EA, LA and LEA. For user and juror, classes User and Juror are
defined separately as subclasses of Entity class because they both share some
commonalities of Entity class yet they have some other unique features.
In addition, some utility classes are also defined. RSA class is responsible for key and
share operations such as generation of RSA key pairs or recovery of private key from the
given shares. Classes U_InfoDialog, LEA_InfoDialog, Info and interface ResultProcessor
are used to provide a user-friendly input dialog box.
Based the above classes, it is possible to define the following classes:
1. U
This class represents the user client program which is used for key registration;
2. EA
This class represents the EA server program which interacts with user and LEA
clients;

3. LA
This class represents the LA server program which interacts with EA and J
servers;
4. J
This class represents the juror server program which interacts with EA server
and user and LEA clients.
Interactions among various clients and servers follow closely the protocol of Scheme 3.
Instructions for compiling and running of these programs can be found in the README
section below. Output of some example sessions can be found at the end of this appendix.

CLASS DESCRIPTION
This section provides the specification of all classes.
Let
w = number of jurors in one jury
t = number of jurors needed to recover a user's private key
cac = number of key pairs a user has to generate in the
cut-and-choose protocol
L Entity classes
class Entity
Data:
public String name, host (entity name and host name)
public int port (port number of the host)
public Socket socket (socket connection)
public PrintStream ps (print stream for the socket connection)
public DatalnputStream dis (input stream for the socket)
Note: LA, EA and LEA are objects of class Entity
class User inherits Entity
Data:
public int ID (user ID)
public String address (user's address)
public int tel (user's telephone number)
public int chosen__nr (chosen key by EA NOT to be opened)
public long[] pks, sks, nmod (RSA key arrays of size w)
public longO rmod (prime number array of size w for Shamir's scheme)
public RSAQ RSAKeys (array of size w of RSA key objects)
public JurorQ jury (array of size w of selected jury)
class Juror inherits Entity
Data:
public long pk, sk, p, q, nmod (juror's RSA key pair)
public int UserlD (user ID)
public int chosen_nr (chosen key by EA NOT to be opened)
public longD shares (array of size cac for holding shares)

2. Utility classes
class RSA
Methods:
public long RandGong n)
generates random numbers less than n
private long Rand()
generates random numbers less than MAX (a predefined value)
private long LRandQ
generates random numbers between MAX*MAX and MAX*MAX*MAX
public long Fastexp(long a, long z, long n)
calculates fast exponentiation
private long gcd(long a, long n)
calculates common greatest divisor
private boolean Tes3Prime(long n)
tests whether n is prime
private long PrimeQ
generates a prime number less than MAX
private long LPrime()
generates a prime number between MAX*MAX and MAX*MAX*MAX
private long Inverse(long n2, long nl)
finds the inverse of a number
private long Public_Key()
generates a public key
private long Private_Key()
generates a private key
public void Gen_UKey()
generates an RSA key pair for user
public void Gen_JKeyO
generates an RSA key pair for juror
public long Encrypt(long X)
encrypts X
public long Decrypt(long Y)
decrypts Y
public void Split_key()
splits a private key into w shares using Shamir's scheme
public void Encrypt_Share(JurorD jury)
encrypts each share with the corresponding juror's public key
public void Decrypt_Share(longD sks, long[] mods)
decrypts each share with the corresponding juror's private key
public long Recover_key(int[] pos, long[] shadow, long modulus)
recovers the private key from any t shares

the following methods allow changing of private data
public void SetPK(long pk)
public void SetSK^ong sk)
public void SetN(long modulus)
the following methods allow access of private data
public long PK()
public long SKO
public long N()
public long PO
public long QO
public long MO
public long R()
public longD SHARESO
public long SHARE(int pos)
Data:
long p, q, m, e, d, n (for RSA key pair)
long r, a[], share[] (for Shamir scheme)
static final int PRIME_WITNESS (maximum value for Lehman's test)
static final int MAX = 1000 (arbitray set constant)
static final int t = 3, w = 5 (theshold values)
class U_InfoDialog inherits Dialog
private TextField fieldl, field2, field3
these fields are used to capture input data from the dialog box by user
class LEA_InfoDialog inherits Dialog
private TextField fieldl, field2, fieldS
these fields are used to capture input data from the dialog box by LEA
class Info
public String fieldl, field2, fieldS
these fields are used to store the input data from the dialog box
interface ResultProcessor
public void processResult(Dialog source. Object obj)
this method allows the implementor program to obtain data from dialog box source

3. User client program
class U inherits Frame and implements ResultProcessor
Buttons:
User Registration Information
Display an input dialog box and capture user information
EA Connection Information
Display an input dialog box and capture EA information
Request
Juryto send jury's encryption keys to user
Request EA
Challenge Jury
Requested jury is challenged
EA has to send juror's connection information to user
User then connects to each juror of the challenged jury
Each juror sends p and q to user
User checks if p*q = n for each juror
If this is true for aU w jurors, then the EA is honest
Accept Chosen Jury
User accepts the selected jury
User proceeds to generate key pairs
Generate Keys
Generates all cac RSA key pairs for cut-and-choose protocol
Write all keys to a file caUed "Ukey.dat"
Generate Shares
Reads cac key pairs from "Ukey.dat" file
Generates w shares for each of all cac private keys
Send Shares to Jury
Sends all shares to jury via EA
Waits for the reply from EA
If EA accepts registratioin, EA sends which key pair is chosen
Write selected key pair to the same file
Overwites the previous content of the file
Label:
Status Bar
TextField:
status
gives the instruction for the next step to follow
notifies the result of each step

Data:
TextField status
Entity LA
Entity EA
User user
FileOutputStream fos (write to file "Ukey.dat")
PrintStream f
FilelnputStream fis (read from file "Ukey.dat")
DatalnputStream if
String fname (file name)
int w, cac

4. EA server program
classEA
Methods:
public void EA_listenO
Starts the EA server
Reads the first message from the client
Classify each client
Handles each client according to its type
public void handle_LEA(Socket sock, DatalnputStream cin, PrintStream cout)
Handles LEA request for recovery suspect's private key
by sending all w jurors connection information to LEA
public void handle__U(Socket sock, DatalnputStream cin, PrintStream cout)
Handles user's registration by recording user information and
then sends back user's ID
public void Summon_J(Socket sock, DatalnputStream cin, PrintStream cout)
EA requests jury from LA
LA sends w randomly selected jurors
LA sends connection infommation of this jury to EA
EA dien summons the jury
Each juror sends die encryption key to EA
EA pass all w encryption keys to user
public void Challenge_J(Socket sock, DatalnputStream cin, PrintStream cout)
User challenges the selected jury
EA sends connection information of the challenged jurors to user

public void Accept_J(Socket sock, DatalnputStream cin, PrintStream cout)
User sends all cac public keys to EA
User sends w encrypted shares of corresponding private key to EA
EA sends the shares to corresponding jurors
EA generates a random number less than cac
EA sends cac to each juror
Each juror returns w-1 decrypted unchosen shares to EA
EA recovers the w-1 private keys
EA checks whether these keys are genuine
EA notifies user the result
Data:
int next (next user ID)
RSA aRSA
Entity LA
Entity EA
UserQ (array of all users)
User (current user)
ServerSocket listener (server socket)

5.LA server program
classLA
Methods:
public int Rand(int n)
Generates a random number less than n
public void readFileO
Reads in the juror population kept in the file "Jlistdat"
public void LA_listenO
Starts the LA server
Reads the first message from the client
Classify each client
Handles each client according to its type
public void handle_J(DataInputStream cin, PrintStream cout)
Accepts new juror registration
public void handle_EA(DataInputStream cin, PrintStream cout)
Randomly selects w jurors from the juror population
Sends connection information of these w jurors to EA

Data:
int next (next user DD)
Entity[] jurors (array of jurors)
ServerSocket listener (server socket)
FilelnputStream fis (input stream to read juror file)
DatalnputStream rf
String fname (" Jlistdat")

6. J server program
class J
Methods:
public void J_listen()
starts the J server
reads the first message from the client
classify each client
handles each client according to its type
public void handle_EA(DataInputStream cin, PrintStream cout)
generates a key pair
sends the encryption key to EA
if user does not challenge this juror, receives all cac shares from EA
decrypt all shares and returns aU unchosen shares to EA
public void handle__U(DataInputStream cin, PrintStream cout)
user challenges this juror
juror sends the values of p and q to user
public void handle__LEA(DataInputStream cin, PrintStream cout)
LEA requests share for recovery of user's private key
this juror sends the share to LEA
Data:
RSA aRSA
Entity LA
Entity EA
Juror juror
ServerSocket listener (server socket)

7. LEA client program
class LEA extends Frame implements ResultProcessor
Buttons:
User Information
display an input dialog box and capture user information
EA Connection Information
display an input dialog box and capture EA information
Request Jury's Shares
requests jury's connection information from EA
sends request to each of w jurors
recvoers the suspect's private key
Label: recover User's Key
Status Bar
TextField:
status
Gives the instruction for the next step to follow
notifies the result of each step
Data:
TextField status
Entity EA
User user
int w
long r, sk
long[] shares

README
This section explain how to install, compile and run these programs.
Follow the steps below:
1. Create a new directory;
2. Copy all programs into this directory;
3. Change the host name and port number of the servers if necesseary;
4. Compile all modules using the following command:
javac -deprecation *.java
5. Run the clients and servers in the following order:
5.1 LA by typing Java LA
5.2 EA by typing Java EA
5.3 J by typing Java <port number> (port number from 1 to 10)
5.4 U by typing Java LF
5.5 LEA by typing Java LEA
6. Instructions for user client:
6.1 push button "User Registration Information" and enter user information;
6.2 push button "EA Connection Information" and enter EA information;
6.3 push button "Request Jury", user can either accept or challenge the jury;
6.4 push button "Challenge Jury" to challenge selected jury;
6.5 repeat the steps 6.3 and 6.4 until user is satisfied that EA is honest;
6.6 push button "Accept Chosen Jury" to accept selected jury;
6.7 push button "Generate Keys" to generate cac key pairs which are
written to a data file called Ukey.dat;
6.8 push button "Generate Shares" to generate w shares for each private
key;
6.9 push button "Send Shares to Jury" to send shares to jury via EA;
6.10 if user does not cheat, the chosen key wiU be rewritten to the same
data file;
6.11 user can try to cheat by changing some private keys in the data file
before share generation. User may be caught cheating by EA and a
warning message will be displayed.
7. Instructions for LEA client:
7.1 push button "User Information" and enter user information;
7.2 push button "EA Connection Information" and enter EA information;
7.3 push button "Request Jury's Shares" to request suspect's shares from
the jury;
7.4 push button "Recover User's Key" to recover the suspect's private key
which will be displayed in the screen.

SOURCE CODE
1. Entity .Java
import java.neL*;
import java.io.*;
class Entity
{
public String name, host;
public int port;
public Socket sock;
public PrintStream ps;
public DatalnputStream dis;

}

2. User .Java
class User extends Entity

}

public String address;
public int tel;
public int ID, chosen_nr;
public long[] pks, sks, nmod, rmod;
public RSA[] RSAKeys;
public Juror[] jury;

3. Juror.java
class Juror extends Entity
{
public long pk, sk, p, q, nmod;
public int chosen_nr, UserlD;
public longO shares;

}

4. Info.java
class Info
{

/*

this class contains fields the are used to store the input data from dialog box
*/
public String fdl;
public String fd2;
public String fd3;
public Info(String fl, String f2. String f3)
{ f d l = f l ; f d 2 = f2;fd3 = f3; }

}

5. ResultProcessor.java
import Java.awL*;
interface ResultProcessor
{
/*

this interface allows the implementor program to obtain data from dialog box
*/
public void processResult(Dialog source, Object obj);

6.RSA.java
public class RSA
{
public RSAO
{
p = q = m = e = d = n = -l;
a = new long[t];
share = new long[w];

}
//generate random numbers less than n and MAX
public long Rand(long n)
{
long a = (long) ((Math.randomO*MAX) % n);
return a;

}
//generate random numbers less than MAX (a predefined value)
private long RandQ
{
long a = (long) (Math.random() * MAX);
return a;

}
//generate random numbers between MAX*MAX and MAX*MAX*MAX
//this is used to generate the prime number for Shamir's scheme
private long LRandQ
boolean done = false;
long a = 0;
while(!done)
{
a = (long) (Math.random() * MAX * MAX • MAX);
if(a>MAX*MAX)
done = true;

}

return a;

}

//compute a'^z mod n
public long Fastexp(long a, long z, long n)
long X = 1;
while
{ (z != 0)
while
{ (z % 2 = 0)
z/=2;
a = (( a % n) * ( a % n ) ) % n;

}

}

}

Z-;
X = ((X %

return x;

n ) * ( a % n )) % n;

//compute the common greatest divisor by using
//Euclidean algorithm
private
long gcdQong a, long n)
{
if(a
{ > n)
long tmp = a;
a = n;
n = tmp;
}
long gO = n;
long gl = a;
long g2 = 0;
while(gl
1=0)
{
g2 = g0%gl;
gO = gl;
gl = g2;
}return gO;

}

//test whether n is prime by using Lehman's test
private boolean TestPrime(long n)
if(n % 2 = 0) return false;
int i = 0;
long a, result;

whHe (i < PRIME^WITNESS)

}

a = Rand(n);
if(gcd(a, n) > 1) return false;
result = Fastexp(a, (n-l)/2, n);
if((result == 1) II (result == n-1)) i++;
else return false;

return true;

}

//generate a prime number less than MAX
private long PrimeQ
{
boolean done = false;
long prime = 1;
while((!done) II (prime = 1))
{
prime = Rand();
done = TestPrime(prime);
return prime;

}

//generate a prime number between MAX*MAX and MAX*MAX*MAX
private long LPrime()
{
boolean done = false;
long prime = 1;
while((!done) II (prime == 1))
{
prime = LRand();
done = TestPrime(prime);

}

}

return prime;

//find the inverse of n2 mod nl by using
//extended Euclidean algorithm
private long Inverse(long n2, long nl)
{
if(n2 < 0) n2 = nl + n2;
long inverse;
long tmp = nl;
long al = 1:
long bl = 0
long a2 = 0
long b2 = 1;
long t = 0;
long q = nl /n2;
long r = nl - q * n2;

while (r != 0)
{
nl = n2;
n2 = r;
t = a2;
a2 = al - q*a2;
al = t;
t = b2;
b2 = bl - q * b2;
bl=t;
q = nl / n2;
r = nl - q * n2;

}

inverse = (b2 > 0) ? b2 : tmp + b2;
return inverse;

//generate a public key
private long I^blic_KeyO
{
long aRand = 0;
boolean done = false;
while(!done)
{
aRand = Rand(m);
if (gcd(aRand, m) = 1) done = true;

}

}

System.out.println("public key:" + aRand);
return aRand;

//generate a private key
private long Private__Key()
{
long aPKey;
aPKey = Inverse(e, m);
System.outprintln("private key:" + aPKey);
return aPKey;

}

//generate an RSA key pair for user
public void Gen_UKey()
{
while(true)
{
p = PrimeO;
if(p < 200) break;

}

System.out.println("p:" + p);

while(true)
{
q = PnmeO;
if((q < 200) && (q != p)) break;
System.out.println("q:" + q);
n = p * q;
System.out.println("n:" + n);
m = (p-l)*(q-l);
System.out.println("m:" + m);
e = Public^KeyO;
d = Private_Key();
long unity = (e * d) % m;
System.out.println("e * d mod m = " + unity);

}
//generate an RSA key pair for juror
public void GenJKeyO
{
while(true)
{
p = PrimeO;
if(p > 200) break;

}

System.out.println("p:" + p);
while(true)
{
q = PrimeO;
if((q > 200) && (q != p)) break;

}

System.out.println("q:" + q);
n = p * q;
System.out.prindn("n:" + n);
m = (p-l)*(q-l);
System.ouLprintlnC'm:" + m);
e = Public_Key();
d = Private_Key();
long unity = (e * d) % m;
System.out.println("e * d mod m = " + unity);

}
//encrypt X
public long Encrypt(long X)
long Y = FastexpCX, e, n);
return Y;

}

//decrypt Y
public long Decrypt(long Y)

}

long X = Fastexp(Y, d, n);
return X;

//split a private key into w shares using Shamir's scheme
public void Split_key()
r = LPrimeO; //r must be greater than n or MAX*MAX
while((r <= d) II (r <= w))
r = PrimeO;
a[0] = share[0] = d; //d is the secret
System.out.println("r = " + r);
//generate w different numbers
for(int i=l; i<t; i-H-)
{
boolean done = false;
while(!done)
{
int collision = 0;
a[i] = Rand(r);
for(intj = 0;j <i; j++)
if(a[i] = a[j])
collision++;
if(collision == 0) done = true;

}

}

share[0] += a[i];

//generate shares
share[0] %= r;
for(int i = 0; i < t; i++)
System.outprindnC'coeff" + i + " = " + a[i]);
System.out.prindn("share " + 0 + " = " + share[0]);
for(int i = 1; i < w; i-H-)
{
share[i] = a[0] + (i + 1) * a[l];
for(intj = 2;j<t;j++)
share[i] += ajj] * Fastexp(i + 1, j, r);
share[i] %= r;
System.out.prindn("share " + i + " = " + share[i]);

}

}

//encrypt each share with the corresponding juror's public key
public void Encrypt_Share(Juror[] jury)
{
for(int i = 0; i < w; i++)
share[i] = Fastexp(share[i], jury[i].pk, jury[i].nmod);

}

//decrypt each share with the corresponding juror's private key
public void Decrypt_Share(long[] sks, longQ mods)
for(int i = 1; i < w; i++)
sharep] = Fastexp(share[i], sks[i], mods[i]);

}
//recover the private key from any t shares
public long Recover_key(int[] pos, long[] shadow, long modulus)
long sum = 0;
for(int i = 0; i < t; i++)
{
long numerator = 1;
long denominator = 1;
for(intj = 0;j<t;j++)
{

ifa!=i)
{

numerator *= -pos[j];
denominator *= (pos[i] - pos[j]);

}
}if(numerator < 0) numerator = modulus + numerator;

}

}

sum += shadow[i] * numerator * Inverse(denominator, modulus);

sum %= modulus;
return sum;

//the following methods allow changing of private data
public void SetPK(long pk)
{
e = pk;

}

public void SetSK(long sk)
{
d = sk;

}

public void SetN(long modulus)
{
n = modulus;

)

//the following methods allow access of private data
public long PK()
return e;
public long SK()
return d;
public long N()
return n;
public long P()
return p;
public long QO
return q;
public long MO
return m;
public long RO
return r;
public longD SHARESO //return aU shares
return share;

public
{ long SHARE(int pos) //return one specified share
return share[pos];

}

private long p, q, m, e, d, n, r, aQ, shareQ;
static final int PRIME_WITNESS = 99;
static final int MAX = 1000;
static final int t = 3;
static final int w = 5;

7. Jlistdat
peterl
vivaldi
6001
peter2
vivaldi
6002
peter3
vivaldi
6003
peter4
vivaldi
6004
peterS
vivaldi
6005
peter6
vivaldi
6006
peter?
vivaldi
6007
peterS
vivaldi
6008
petei9
vivaldi
6009
peterlO
vivaldi
6010
8. U.java
import Java, awt *;
import javaio.*;
importjava.net*;
this class containsfieldsthat are used to capture input data from dialog box
class
{ U_InfoDialog extends Dialog

/*

this constructor creates a GUI dialog box for a user to enter his personal data
*/ pubUc U_InfoDialog(U parent, Info u, String fDl, String fD2, String fD3)
{

super(parent, "Input Info", true);
Panel pi = new PanelQ;
pl.setLayout(new GridLayout(3, 2));
pLadd(new Label(fDl));
pl.add(FDl = new TextField(u.fdl, 8))
pl.add(new Label(fD2));
pl.add(FD2 = new TextField(u.fd2, 8))
pLadd(new Label(fD3));
pLadd(FD3 = new TextField(u,fd3, 8))
add("Center", pi);

/*

}

Panel p2 = new Panel();
p2.add(new Button("Ok"));
p2.add(new Button("Cancel"));
add("South", p2);
resize(350,150);

this method handles action event and captures user input after a user
pushes the "Ok" button
*/
public boolean action(Event evt, Object arg)
if(arg.equals("Ok"))
{
disposeO;
((ResultProcessor)getParent()).processResult(this,
new Info(FDl.getText(), FD2.getText(), FD3.getText()));

}

else if (arg.equals("Cancel"))
disposeO;
else return super.action(evt, arg);
return true;

this method destroys the dialog box
*/
public boolean handleEvent(Event evt)
{
if (evtid = Event WINDOW.DESTROY)
disposeO;
else return super.handleEvent(evt);
return true;

/*

}

these fields are used to capture input data from the dialog box

}

private TextField FDl;
private TextField FD2;
private TextField FD3;

/*

User client program
*/
public class U extends Frame implements ResultProcessor

/*
This constructor creates entity objects and a GUI frame so that a
user can perform key escrow procedure and check the status easily
pubHc U()
{
LA = new Entity();
EA = new EntityO;
user = new User();
fname = "Ukey.dat";
w = 5;
cac = 10;
setTitleC'User Registration");
setLayout(new RowLayoutQ);
add(new Button("User Registration Information"));
add(new Button("EA Connection Information"));
add(new Button("Request Jury"));
add(new Button("Challenge Jury"));
add(new Button("Accept Chosen Jury"));
add(new ButtonfGenerate Keys"));
add(new Button("Generate Shares"));
add(new Button("Send Shares to Jury"));
Label st = new Label ("Status Bar");
add(st);
status = new TextField("Start: enter User Registration Information", 35);
status.setEditable(false);
add(status);

/*

}

This is an implementation of the interface processResult
which actually pass data from a dialog box to this program
*/
public void processResult(Dialog source, Object result)
{
if(source instanceof U_InfoDialog)
{
Info info = (Info)result;
if("EA".equals(info.fdl)) //it is an EA input dialog box
{
EA.host = info.fd2;
EA.port = Integer.parseInt(info.fd3);

}

else //it is a user input dialog box
user.name = info.fdl;
user.address = info.fd2;
user.tel = Integer.parseInt(info.fd3);

/*

}

}

^ s method destroys the user client window and exits the program
public boolean handleEvent(Event evt)
if(evtid = Event.WINDOW_DESTROY) System.exit(O);
return super.handleEvent(evt);

/*
this method capmres action event and takes appropriate action
depending the type of event
*/
public boolean action(Event evt. Object arg)
try{
this event handles user's input of personal data
*/
if (arg.equalsC'User Registration Information"))
{
System.out.prindn("User Registration Information");
Info inl = new Info("name", "uow", "8888");
U_InfoDialog pdl = new U__InfoDialog(this, inl, "name",
"address", "tel no");
pdl.showO;
status.setText("next step: enter EA information");

/•

}

this event handles user's input of EA's connection information
*/
else if(arg.equals("EA Connection Information"))
{
Info in2 = new Info("EA", "vivaldi", "3838");
UJnfoDialog pd2 = new U_InfoDialog(this, in2, "name", "host",
"port");
pd2.show();
System.out.println(EA.name + " " + EA.host + " " + EA.port);
status.setText("Trying to connect to EA...");
System.out.println("Trying to connect to EA...");

/*
connect to EA's socket
•/
EA.sock = new Socket(EA.host, EA.port);
EA.dis = new DataInputStream(EA.sock.getInputStream());
EA.ps = new PrintStream(EA.sock.getOutputStream());

status.setText("Connected to EA, request jury now!!!");
System.out.println("Connected to EA, request jury now!!!");

/*

send request for key escrow service to EA
EA.ps.println("U REQ REG EA");

/*

send user data to EA
*/

}

EA.ps.println(user.name);
EA.ps.println(user.ad dress);
EA.ps.println(String.valueOf(user.tel));

this event handles user's request to EA for jury
*/
else if(arg.equals("Request Jury"))
{
System.out,println("Request Jury");
EA.ps.println("U REQ EA"); //send the request
status.setText("Requesting jury...");
System.out.println(EA.dis.readLine());//display EA's reply

/*

read in encryption keys of w jurors from EA
*/
user .jury = new Juror[w];
for(int i = 0; i < w; i++)
{
System.ouLprintln("pk of juror " + i);
Juror juror = new Juror();
juror, pk = Long.parseLong(EA.dis.readLine());
System.outprintln(String.valueOf(juror.pk));
juror.nmod = Long.parseLong(EA.dis.rea(lLine());
System.out.println(String.valueOf(juror.nmod));
user.jury[i] = juror;

}

status.setText("Challenge or Accept jury now!!!");
System.out.prindn("Challenge or Accept jury now!!!");

this event handles challenge of jury by user
else if(arg.equals("Challenge Jury"))

/*

System.out.println("Challenge Jury");

user sends challenge to EA
*/
EA.ps.println("U CHALLENGE J EA");
int honest = 0;
System.out.println(EA.dis.readLine())-y/display EA's reply

/*

user reads connection information of w jurors from EA
and check with each juror whether EA is honest
*/
for(int i = 0; i < w; i++)
{
System.out.println("connect to juror " + i);
user reads connection information of each juror from EA
*/
Juror juror = user.jury[i];
juror.name = EA.dis.readLineO;
System.out.println(juror.name);
juror.host = EA.dis.readLineO;
System.out.printin(juror.host);
juror.port = Integer.parseInt(iEA.dis.readLine());
System.out.printin(String.valueOf(juror.port));

/*

user reads connects to each juror

*/

juror.sock = new Socket(juror.host, juror.port);
juror.dis = new
DataInputStream(juror.sock.getInputStream());
juror.ps = new PrintStream (juror.sock.getOutputStreamQ);

user sends challenge to juror
*/
juror.ps.printinC'U CHALLENGE J");
juror.ps.printin(String.valueOf(user.ID));
System.out.printin(juror.dis.readLineO);

/*

user
*/ reads p and q from each juror
juror.p = Long.parseLongCjuror.dis.readLineO);
juror.q = Long.parseLongO'uror.dis.readLineQ);
System.ouLprintin(String.valueOf(juror.p));
System.out.printin(String.valueOfOuror.q));
juror.sock.closeO;

/*

user checks whether EA is honest with respect to this juror
*/
if(juror.p*juror.q == juror.nmod) honest++;
System.out.printin("honesty value is:" +
String. valueOf (honest));

/*

}

notify user whether EA is honest
*/
if(honest == w) status.setText("EA is honest!!!");
else status.setTextC'EA is NOT honest!!!");

if(honest == w) System.out.println("EA is honest!!!");
else System.out.prinan("EA is NOT honest!!!");

}
/*

this event handles user's acceptance of jury
else if (arg.equalsC'Accept Chosen Jury"))
status.setText("next step: Generate Keys!!!");
System.out.println("next step: Generate Keys!!!");
/•

this event handles generation of cac key pairs
*/
else if (arg.equals("Generate Keys"))
{
System.ouLprintln("Generate Keys and write to file");
try{
fos = new FileOutputStream(fname);
f = new Printstream(fos);
}catch(IOException ioe) { }
user.RSAKeys = new RSA[cac];
for(int i=0; i< w; i-H-)
user.jury[i].shares = new long[cac];
/*

generate cac key pairs and write all keys to a file
*/
for(int i=0; i< cac; i++)
{
user.RSAKeys[i] = new RSA();
user.RSAKeys[i].Gen_UKeyO;
f.println(String.valueOf(user.RSAKeys[i].PK()));
f.println(String.valueOf(user.RSAKeys[i].SK()));
f.println(String.valueOf(user.RSAKeys[i].N()));

}

fos.closeO;
status.setText("done!!! next step: Generate Shares now!!!");

}
/*

this event handles generation of w shares for each of cac private keys
Note: a user can try to cheat by tampering with the private keys in the file
before this step is performed but he/she may be caught by EA
•/
else if (arg.equals("Generate Shares"))
System.out.println(" Read file and Generate Shares");
try
{
fis = new FilelnputStream(fname);
rf = new DatalnputStream(fis);

}catch(IOException ioe) { }

read the keys back from the file and split each private key into w shares
*/
for(int i = 0; i < cac; i++)
{
long pk = Long.parseLong(rf.readLine());
user.RSAKeys[i].SetPK(pk);
long sk = Long.parseLong(rf.readLine());
user.RSAKeys[i].SetSK(sk);
long n = Long.parseLong(rf.readLine());
user.RSAKeys[i].SetN(n);
user.RSAKeys[i].Split_key();

/*

encrypt each share with corresponding juror's encryption key
*/
user.RSAKeys[i].Encrypt_Share(user.jury);
for(int j = 0; j < w; j++)
user.jury[j].shares[i] = user.RSAKeys[i].SHARE(j);

}

/*

}

fis.closeO;
status.setTextC'done!!! next step: Send Shares now!!!");

this event handles user's sending of shares to each of w jurors via EA after
user has accepted the jury
else if (arg.equalsC'Send Shares to Jury"))

/*

System.out.println("Send encrypted shares to Jury");

notify EA to receive shares
*/
EA.ps.prindn("U SEND SHARES EA");
status.setText("Sending shares!!!");

/*

send cac public keys to EA first
System.out.println("send cac public keys to EA first");
for(int i = 0; i < cac; i++)
System.out.prindn("pk, n, r for i = " + i);
EA.ps.println(String.valueOf(user.RSAKeys[i].PK()));
System.out.prindn(String.valueOf
(user.RSAKeys[i].PK()));
EA.ps.println(String.valueOf(user.RSAKeys[i].N()));
System.out.println(String.valueOf(user.RSAKeys[i].N()));
EA.ps.println(String.valueOf(user.RSAKeys[i].R()));

^

System.out.println(String.valueOf(user.RSAKeys[i].R()));

/*

send encrypted shares to jurors via EA
*/
System.out.println("send encrypted shares to jurors via EA");
for(int i = 0; i < w; i++)
{
System.out.println("shares to juror" + i);
for(int j = 0; j < cac; j-H-)
EA.ps.println(String.valueOf
(user.jury[i] .shares[j]));
System.out.println(String.valueOf
(user.jury[i].shares[j]));

/*

1

}

EA accepts key registration
*/
ifC'EA ACCEPT KEY U".equals(EA.dis.readLineO))
{
System.outprindnC'EA accepts key registration");
read the chosen key
*/

/*

String s = EA.dis.readLine();
System.ouLprintlnC'chosen key no:" + s);
user.chosen_nr = Integer.parselnt(s);
try
{
fis = new FilelnputStream(fname);
rf = new DatalnputStream(fis);
}catch(IOException ioe) { }
long pk = 0, sk = 0, n = 0;

overwrite the file with this chosen key

*/

for(int i = 0; i <= user.chosen_nr; i++)
{

}

pk = Long.parseLong(rf.readLine());
sk = Long.parseLong(rf.readLineO);
n = Long.parseLong(rf.readLine());

fis.closeO;
try{
fos = new FileOutputStream(fname);
f = new Printstream(fos);
}catch(IOException ioe) { }
System.out.prindn("pk:" + String.valueOf(pk));
System.ouLprintln("sk:" + String.valueOf(sk));

System.out.println("n:" + String.valueOf(n));
f.println(String.valueOf(pk));
f.println(String.valueOf(sk));
f.println(String.valueOf(n));
fos.closeO;
/*

notify user the result
*/

}

status.setTextC'chosen key:" +
String.valueOf(user.chosen_nr) + " Jcey escrow done!!!");
System.out.println("key escrow done!!!");

else
{
status.setText("You are caught cheating!!!");
System.outprintln("You are caught cheating!!!");

}

^

else return super.action(evt, arg);
}catch(IOException ioe) { }
repaintO;
return true;

}

public static void main(StringO args)
{
Frame f = new UQ;
f.resize(400, 200);
f.showQ;

}
TextField status;
Entity LA;
Entity EA;
User user;
FUeOutputStream fos;
PrintStream f;
FilelnputStream fis;
DatalnputStream rf;
String fname;
int w, cac;

9. EAjava
import java.io.*;
importjava.net*;
import java.utiL*;
class EA
{
public EA()
{
next = 0;
w = 5;
t = 3;
cac = 10;
aRSA = new RSA();
LA = new Entity();
EA = new Entity();
users = new User[cac];
listener = null;

/*

}

this method starts the EA server
*/
public void EA_listen() throws lOException
listener = new ServerSocket(3838);
while (true)
{
Socket sock = listener.accept();
PrintStream cout = new PrintStream(sock.getOutputStream());
DatalnputStream cin = new
DataInputStream(sock. getlnputStream 0);
ifC'LEA REQ USER EA".equals(cin.readLine()))// if cHent is LEA
{
System.out.println("LEA requests suspect's key");
handle_LEA(sock, cin, cout);

}

else //if client is user
{
System.out.println("User request");
handle_U(sock, cin, cout);
String s = cin.readLineO;
System.out.println(s);
boolean accept = false;
while(! accept) // if user does not accept jury
{
if("U REQ EA".equals(s)) //user requests jury
Summon_J(sock, cin, cout);
else if("U CHALLENGE J EA".equals(s))

//user challenges jury
Challenge_J(sock, cin, cout);
else
break;
s = cin.readLineO;
System.out.println(s);

}

}

System.out.println("call Accept_J");
Accept_J(sock, cin, cout); //user accepts jury
sockxloseO;
next-H-; //increment user ID

}
/*

this method handles LEA's request
*/
public void handle_LEA(Socket sock, DatalnputStream cin, PrintStream cout) throws
lOException
{
/*

return the prime number used in secret sharing
*/
System.out.println("send r :" +
String.valueOf(user.rmod[user.chosen_nr]));
cout.println(String. valueOf(user.rmod [user.chosen_nr]));
System.out.println(cin.readLine());
cout.println("EA SEND JURY INFO LEA");
System.out.println("EA SEND JURY INFO LEA");
/*

send suspect's jury to LEA
*/
System.out.println("send suspect's jury");
for(int i = 0; i < w; i++)
{
Juror juror = user .jury [i];
cout println(juror.name);
System.out.println(juror.name);
cout.println(juror.host);
System.out.println(juror.host);
cout.prindn(String.valueOf(juror.port));
System.out.println(String.valueOf(juror.port));

}

}

/*

this method handles registration of user's personal data
*/

/*

public void handle_U(Socket sock, DatalnputStream cin, PrintStream cout) throws
lOException
{
user = new User();
user.sock = sock;
user.ID = next;
user.dis = cin;
user.ps = cout;

record user info
*/
System.out.prindn("record user info");
user.name = user.dis.readLine();
System.out.println(user.name);
user.host = user.dis.readLine();
System, out.println(user.host);
user.port = Integer.parseInt(user.dis.readLine());
System.out.println(String.valueOf(user.port));
System.out.println(String.valueOf(next));
users[next] = user;

/*

}

this method summons the jury
*/
public void Summon_J(Socket sock, DatalnputStream cin, PrintStream cout)
throws lOException
{
System.out.println("summons the jury");

/*

this port is fixed and must be changed and recompiled again if this program
is run in another host other than "vivaldi"
*/
LA.sock = new Socket("vivaldi", 8383);
LA.dis = new DataInputStream(LA.sock.getInputStream());
LA.ps = new PrintStream(LA.sock.getOutputStream());

/*

EA requests jury from LA
*/
LA.ps.println("EA REQ J LA");
System.out.println("EA REQ J LA");
users[next].ps.printin("EA SEND JKEYS U");
System.out.println("EA SEND JKEYS U");
System.out.println(LA.dis.readLine());

/*

users[next].jury = new Juror[w];
System.out.prindn("read jury's connection information");
for(int i = 0; i < w; i+4-)
{
System.out.println("Juror " + i);

read jury's connection information
*/

Juror juror = new JurorQ;
juror.name = LA.dis.readLineO;
System.out.println(juror.naine);
juror.host = LA.dis.readLine();
System.out.println(juror.host);
String s = LA.dis.readLineO;
System.out.println(s);
juror.port = Integer.parselnt(s);
System .out. println(j uror. name);
System.out.println(juror.host);
System.out.println(String.valueOf(juror.port));

/*

connect to each juror's socket
*/
juror.sock = new Socket(juror.host, juror.port);
juror.dis = new DataInputStream(juror.sock.getInputStream());
juror.ps = new PrintStream(juror.sock.getOutputStreamO);
summon each juror
*/
juror.ps.printlnC'EA SUMMON J");
System.out.printin("EA SUMMON J");
juror.ps.println(String.valueOf(next));
System.out.prindn(String.valueOf(next));

/*

each juror sends encryption key to EA
*/
System.out.println(juror.dis.readLineO);
juror.pk = Long.parseLong(juror.dis.readLine());
juror.nmod = Long.parseLong(juror.dis.readLine());

/*

EA senda each juror's encryption key to user
*/
user.ps.println(String.valueOf(juror.pk));
System.ouLprintln(String.valueOf(juror.pk));
user.ps.println(String.valueOf(juror.nmod));
System.out.prindn(String.valueOf(juror.nmod));
user.jury[i] = juror;

}

}

/*

this method handles challenge of jury
*/
public void Challenge_J(Socket sock, DatalnputStream cin, PrintStream cout)
throws lOException
{
System.outprintlnC'challenge of jury");

/*

EA sends jury's connection information to user
*/
user.ps.printlnC'EA SEND JINFO U");
System.out.println("EA SEND JINFO U");
for(int i = 0; i < w; i++)
{
Juror juror = user .jury [i];
juror.ps.printlnC'EA CHALLENGE J");
System.out.println("EA CHALLENGE J");
user.ps.println(juror.name);
System.out.println(juror.name);
user.ps.println(juror.host);
System.out.printlnQuror.host);
user.ps.println(String.valueOf(juror.port));
System.out.println(String.valueOf(juror.port));

}

LA.sock.closeO;
for(int i = 0; i<w; i++)
{
user .jury [i].sock.close();

/*

}

}

this method handles acceptance of jury by user
*/
public void Accept_J(Socket sock, DatalnputStream cin, PrintStream cout)
throws lOException
{
System.out.println("U SEND SHARES EA");
user.pks = new long[cac];
user.nmod = new long[cac];
user.rmod = new long[cac];

/*

read cac public keys and prime numbers for secret sharing scheme of private keys
System.out.println("read cac pk, n and r");
for(int i = 0; i < cac; i++)

/*

}

System.out.println("user key: " + i);
user.pks[i] = Long.parseLong(user.dis.readLine());
user.nmod[i] = Long.parseLong(user.dis.readLine());
user.rmod[i] = Long.parseLong(user.dis.readLine());
System.out.println(String.valueOf(user.pks[i]));
System.out.println(String.valueOf(user.nmod[i]));
System.out.println(String.valueOf(user.rmod[i]));

read all shares of user's private keys from user
*/
System.out.println("read all shares from user and send all shares to
jurors");

for(int i = 0; i < w; i++)
{
System.out.println("juror: " + i);
Juror juror = user.jury[i];
juror.shares = new longfcac];
juror.ps.printlnC'EA SEND SHARES J");
juror.ps.println(String.valueOf(user.ID));
for(int j = 0; j < cac; j++)
{
System.out.println("encrypted share: " + j);
juror.shares[j] = Long.parseLong(user.dis.readLine());
juror.ps.println(String.valueOf(juror.shares[j]));
System.outprintln(String.valueOf(juror.shares|j]));

/*

}

^

EA chooses a random number between 1 and cac and notify jury
*/
user.chosen_nr = (int)aRSA.Rand(cac);
System.out.println("chosen no: " + String.valueOf(user.chosen_nr));
for(int i = 0; i < w; i++)
{
Juror juror = user .jury [i];
juror.chosen_nr = user.chosen_nr;
juror.ps.printlnC'EA CHOOSE KEY J");
juror.ps.println(String.valueOf(user.chosen_nr));

}

jury send unchosen keys to EA
*/
System.out.prindn("jury send unchosen keys to EA");
for(int i = 0; i < w; i++)
{
System.out.println("juror:" + i);
Juror juror = user.jury[i];
for(int j = 0; j < cac; j++)
{
System.out.println("decrypted share:" + j);
if(j != user.chosen_nr)
{
juror.shareslj] =
Long.parseLong(juror.dis.readLine());
System.out.println(String.valueOf(juror.shares[j]));

/*

}

}

}

verify shares are correct
*/
System.out.prindn("verify shares are correct");
int[] pos = {1,3,5}-// recover shares at these positions

long[] shadow = new long[t];
int honest = 0;
for(int j = 0; j < cac; j++)
{
if(j != user.chosen_nr) //open all keys except the chosen number
for(int i = 0; i < t; i++)
{
shadow[i] = user.jury[pos[i]-l].shares[j];

}

/*

recover each private key
*/
long sk = aRSA.Recover_key(pos, shadow ,user.rmod|j]);
System.out.printlnC'recovered sk:" + String.valueOf(sk));

/*

simple test to check whether each recovered private key is genuine
*/
long ptext = aRSA.Rand(user.nmod[j]);
long ctext = aRSA.Fastexp(ptext, user.pks[j].
user.nmod[j]);
long rtext = aRSA.Fastexp(ctext, sk, user.nmod[j]);
if(rtext = ptext) honest++;
System.out.println("honesty value:" +
String. valueOf (honest));

/*

}

}

notify user whether registration is accepted
*/
if(honest == 9)
{
user.ps.prindnC'EA ACCEPT KEY U");
user.ps.println(String.valueOf(user.chosen_nr));
System.out.printhi("ACCEPT KEY");

}

else
{
user.ps.printlnC'EA not ACCEPT KEY U");
System.out.prindn("not ACCEPT KEY");

}
LA.sock.close();
for(int i = 0; i < w; i++)
{
user.jury[i].sock.close();

}

public static void main(String[] args) throws lOException
{
EA aEA = new EA();

aEA.EA_listen();

}

int next, w, t, cac;
RSA aRSA;
Entity EA, LA;
User[] users;
User user;
ServerSocket listener;

}

10. LA.Java
import java.io.*;
importjava.net.*;
import Java.util.*;
class LA
{
LAO
{

/*

}

jurors = new Entity[99]; //juror population set to 99
listener = null;
fis = null;
rf = null;
fname = "Jlist.dat"; //file containing juror population
w = 5;

this method generates a random number between 1 and n - 1
*/
public int Rand(int n)
^

}

int a = (int) ((Math.randomQ* 10000) % n);
return a;

/*

this method reads in connection information of all jurors in the whole population
kept in a file
*/
public void readFileO throws lOException
System.out.prindn("read juror file");
fis = new FilelnputStream (fname);
rf = new DatalnputStream(fis);
String s = null;
while((s = rf.readLineO) != null)
{

jurors[next] = new EntityO;
jurors[next].name = s;
jurors[next].host = rf.readLine();
jurors[next].port = Integer.parseInt(rf.readLine());
next-H-;
}
for(int i = 0; i < next; i++)

/*

System.out.printlnQurors[i].name);
System.out.println^urors[i].host);
System.out.println(jurors[i].port);

}

this method starts the LA server
*/
public void LA_listen() throws lOException
listener = new ServerSocket(8383); //port number is fixed
while
{ (true)
Socket sock = listener.accept();
Printstream cout = new PrintStream(sock.getOutputStream());
DatalnputStream cin = new
DataInputStream(sock.getInputStream());
String s = cin.readLineO;
System.out.println(s);
ifC'J
{ REQ REG LA".equals(s)) //it is a juror
handle_J(cin, cout);
next-H-;
sock.closeO;
}else ifC'EA REQ J LA".equals(s)) //it is EA
{
handle_EA(cin, cout);
sock.closeO;
}
else
System.out.println("error");

/*

}

}

this method handles juror registration
*/
public
void handle_J(DataInputStream cin, PrintStream cout) throws lOException
{
coutprintlnC'LA ACK REQ J"); //acknowledge request
Entity juror = new EntityO;
read in new juror's connection information
*/

juror.name = cin.readLine();
juror.host = cin.readLine();
juror.port = Integer.parseInt(cin.readLine());
jiirors[next] = juror;
cout.println("LA REG OK J");
System.out.println(juror.name);
System.outprintln^uror.host);
System.out.println(String.valueOfGuror.port));

/*

^ s method handles request from EA to select a jury of w jurors
public void handle_EA(DataInputStream cin, PrintStream cout) throws lOException
System.out.println("send jury to EA");
coutprintkC'LA SEND J EA");
int[] a = new int[w];
randomly select w different numbers less than the size of the juror population
*/
a[0] = Rand(next);
for(int i = 1; i < w; i++)
{
boolean done = false;
while(!done)
{
int collision = 0;
a[i] = Rand(next);
for(intj = 0;j <i; j++)
if(a[i] = aGl)
collision++;
if(collision==0) done = true;

}
}for(int i = 0; i < w; i++)
{

}

System.out.println(jurors[a[i]].name);
System.out.printlnQurors[a[i]].host);
System.out.println^urors[a[i]].port);

send the selected jury to EA
*/
for(int i = 0; i < w; i++)
{
cout.println(jurors[a[i]].name);
cout.println(]urors[a[i]].host);
cout.println(String.valueOf(jurors[a[i]].port));

}

public static void mainCStringQ args)
try{
LA aLA = new LA();
aLA,readFileO;
aLA.LA_listenO;
}catch(IOException ioe) { }
int next, w;
EntityQ jurors;
ServerSocket listener;
FilelnputStream fis;
DatalnputStream rf;
String fname;

11. J.Java
import java.io. »
importjava.net'
import java.util.*;
public class J
{
J(Juror j)
{
juror =j;
cac = 10;
aRSA = new RSAQ;
LA = new Entity0;
EA = new EntityQ;
listener = null;

}

this method starts the juror server
public void J_listen() throws lOException

/*

System.out.println("juror port:" + String.valueOfQuror.port));
listener = new ServerSocket(juror.port);
while (true)
{
Socket sock = listener.acceptQ;
Prints tream cout = new PrintStream(sock.getOutputStream());
DataInputSU"eam cin = new DataInputStream(sock.getInputStream());
String s = cin.readLineO;
System.out.println(s);

check the type of client
*/

ifC'EA SUMMON J".equals(s)) //it is EA
{
handle_EA(cin, cout);
sock.closeO;

}

else ifC'U CHALLENGE J".equals(s)) //it is a user
handle_U(cin, cout);
sock.closeO;

}

else ifC'LEA RECOVER J".equals(s)) //it is LEA
{
handle_LEA(cin, cout);
sock.close();

}

else
System.out.println("error");

}
/*

this method handles summon from EA
*/
public void handle_EA(DataInputStream cin, PrintStream cout) throws lOException

/*

juror.UserlD = Integer.parseInt(cin.readLine()); //get user ID
aRSA.Gen_JKey();
cout.println("JUROR SEND KEY EA");
System.out.println("JUROR SEND KEY EA");

send encryption key to user via EA
cout.println(String.valueOf(aRSA.PK()));
System.out.println(String.valueOf(aRSA.PK0));
cout.println(String.valueOf(aRSA.N()));
System.outprintln(String.valueOf(aRSA.N()));
if(!("EA CHALLENGE J".equals(cin.readLine()))) //user accepts this juror

/*

System.out.println("user accepts this juror");
System.out.println("EA SEND SHARES J");
juror.UserlD = Integer.parseInt(cin.readLine());
juror.shares = new long[cac];

read
*/ in cac shares from the user via EA
System.out.println("read in cac shares from the user via EA");
for(int i = 0; i < cac; i++)
{
System.ouLprintln("share" + i);
juror.shares [i] = Long.parseLong(cin.readLine());

System.out.println("encrypted: " +
String.valueOf(juror.shares[i]));
juror.shares[i] = aRSA.Decrypt(juror.shares[i]);
System.out.println("decrypted:" +
Stxing.valueOf(juror.shares[i]));
System.out.println(cin.readLine()); //EA CHOOSE KEY J

/*

read in the chosen number from EA and then send cac - 1 unchosen shares to EA
*/
juror.chosen_nr = Integer.parseInt(cin.readLine());
System.out.println("chosen no: " +
String.valueOf(jurorxhosen_nr));
for(int i = 0;i < cac; i++)
{
if(i != juror.chosen_nr)
cout,println(String.valueOf(juror.shares[i]));

/*

}

}

}

this method handles challenges from the user
*/
public void handle_U(DataInputStream cin, PrintStream cout) throws lOException
System.out.println("user challenges this juror");
if(juror.UserID == Integer.parseInt(cin.readLine()))
{
send p and q to user directly

/*

}

}

coutprintlnC'J SEND SECRET KEY U");
System.out.prindn("J SEND SECRET KEY U");
cout.println(String.valueOf(aRSA.P()));
System.out.println(String.valueOf(aRSA.P()));
cout.println(String.valueOf(aRSA.Q()));
System.outprintln(String.valueOf(aRSA.Q()));

this method handles key recovery request from LEA
*/
public void handle_LEAPataInputStream cin, PrintStream cout)
throws lOException

//

/*

System.out.prindn("key recovery request from LEA");
if(juror.UserID == Integer. parseInt(cin.readLine()))

{

cout.println("J SEND SHARE LEA");
System.out.prindn("J SEND SHARE LEA");

send user's share to LEA

*/
cout.println(String.valueOf(juror.shares|juror.chosen_nr]));
System.out.println(String.valueOf(juror.shares[juror.chosen_nr]));

/*

}

this method reads in an integer from the command line and adds this integer to
6000, the resulting integer is then used as the port number of this juror
*/
public static void main(Stringn args) throws lOException
{
Juror aj = new JurorQ;
aj.port = 6000 + Integer. parselnt(args[0]);
J aJ = new J(aj);
aJJ_nsten();

}

int cac;
RSA aRSA;
Entity LA;
Entity EA;
Juror juror;
ServerSocket listener;

12. LEA.java
import java.awt*;
import java.io.*;
import java.neL*;
class LEA_InfoDialog extends Dialog
^

public LEA_InfoDialog(LEA parent. Info u. String fDl, String fD2, String fD3)
super(parent, "Input Info", true);
Panel pi = new Panel();
pLsetLayout(new GridLayout(3, 2));
pl.add(new Label(fDl));
pl.add(FDl = new TextField(u.fdl, 8));
pl.add(new Label(fD2));
pl.add(FD2 = new TextField(u.fd2, 8));
pl.add(new Label(fD3));
pl.add(FD3 = new TextField(u.fd3, 8));
add("Center", pi);
Panel p2 = new Panel();
p2.add(new Button("Ok"));

}

p2.add(new Button("Cancel"));
addC'South", p2);
resize(350, 150);

public boolean action(Event evt, Object arg)
if(arg.equals("Ok"))
{
disposeO;
((ResultProcessor)getParent()).processResult(this,
^
new Info(FDl.getText(), FD2.getText(),FD3.getText()));

}

else if (arg.equalsC'Cancel"))
disposeO;
else return super, action (evt, arg);
return true;

public boolean handleEvent(Event evt)
{
if (evtid = Event. WINDOW_DESTROY)
disposeO;
else return super.handleEvent(evt);
return true;

}

}

private TextField FDl;
private TextField FD2;
private TextField FD3;

public class LEA extends Frame implements ResultProcessor
{
public LEA()
{
EA = new EntityO;
user = new User();
fname = "LEAkey.dat";
w = 5;
setTitle("User Key Recovery");
setLayout(new RowLayoutQ);
add(new Button("User Information"));
add(new Button("EA Connection Information"));
add(new Button("Request Jury's Shares"));
add(new Button("Recover User's Key"));
Label st = new Label ("Status Bar");
add(st);

status = new TextField("Start: enter User Information",35);
status.setEditable(false);
add(status);

pubUc void processResult(Dialog source, Object result)
Lf(source instanceof LEA_InfoDialog)
Info info = (Info)result;
if("EA".equals(info.fdl))
EA.host = info.fd2;
EA.port = Integer.parseInt(info.fd3);
else
{
user.name = info.fdl;
user, address = info.fd2;
user.tel = Integer.parseInt(info.fd3);

public boolean handleEvent(Event evt)
if(evtid == Event.WINDOW_DESTROY) System.exit(O);
return super.handleEvent(evt);

public boolean action(Event evt, Object arg)
try{
if (arg.equalsC'User Information"))
{
Info ini = new Info("name", "uow","8888");
LEA_InfoDialog pdl = new LEA_InfoDialog(this, ini,"name",
"address","tei no");
pdl.showO;
status.setText("next step: enter EA information");

}

else if(arg.equals("EA Connection Information"))
Info in2 = new Info("EA", "vivaldi","3838");
LEA_InfoDialog pd2 = new LEA_InfoDialog(this, in2,"EA",
"vivaldi","3838");
pd2.show();
status.setText("Trying to connect to EA...");
EA.sock = new Socket(EA.host, EA.port);

EA.dis = new DataInputStream(EA.sock.getInputStream());
EA.ps = new PrintStream(EA.sock.getOutputStreamO);
status.setTextC'Connected to EA, request jury now!!!");
EA.ps.println("LEA REQ USER EA");
EA .ps.println(user.name);
user .ID = Integer.parseInt(EA.dis.readLine());
r = Long.parseLong(EA.dis.readLine());
System.out.println(r);

//
//

else if(arg.equals("Request Jury's Shares"))
System.out.println("Request Jury's Shares");
status.setTextC'Requesting jury...");
user.jury = new Juror[w];
shares = new long[w];
EA.ps.prindn("LEA REQ JURY EA");
System.out.printhi(EA.dis.readLine());
for(int i = 0; i < w; i++)
{

//

}

}

System.out.printlnC'info of juror "+i);
Juror juror = new JurorQ;
user.jury[i] = juror;
juror.name = EA.dis.readLine();
System.out.println(juror.name);
juror.host = EA.dis.readLine();
System.out.println(juror.host);
juror.port = Integer.parseInt(EA.dis.readLine());
System.out.println(String.valueOf(juror.port));
juror.sock = new Socket(juror.host, juror.port);
juror, dis = new
DataInputStream(juror.sock.getInputStream());
juror.ps = new PrintStream(juror.sock.getOutputStream());
juror.ps.prindn("LEA RECOVER J");
juror.ps.println(String.valueOf(user.ID));
S y stem. out. printlnQ uror. dis. readLine ());
shares[i] = Long.parseLong(juror.dis-readLine());
System.out.println(String.valueOf(shares[i]));
juror.sock.closeO;

EA.sock.closeO;
status.setText("Recover User's Key Now!!!");

else if (arg.equalsC'Recover User's Key"))
{
int[] pos = {1,3,5 }'y/can be set by inputdialog box
long[] shadow = new long[3];
RSA aRSA = new RSA();
for(int i=0; i<3; i-f+)
{
shadow [i] = shares[pos[i]-l];

sk = aRSA.Recover_key(pos, shadow ,r);

}

Systeni.out.println("suspect's sk: " + String.valueOf(sk));
status.setText("Start: enter User Information");

else return super.action(evt, arg);
}catch(IOException ioe) { }
repaintO;
return true;

}

public static void main(String[] args)
{
Frame f = new LEA();
f.resize(320, 200);
f.showO;

}

TextField status;
Entity EA;
User user;
String fname;
int w;
long r, sk;
long[] shares;

OUTPUT OF AN EXAMPLE SESSION
The following is the output of all entities when the user is honest.
1. Output from user client
User Registration Information
null vivaldi 3838
Trying to connect to EA...
Connected to EA, request jury now!!!
Request Jury
EA SEND JKEYS U
pk of juror 0 499
164009
pk of juror 1 475
256769
pk of juror 2 823
538409
pk of juror 3 727
385487
pk of juror 4 865
338243
Challenge or Accept jury now!!!
Challenge Jury
EA SEND JINFO U
connect to juror 0
peter3 vivaldi 6003 J SEND SECRET KEY U
401
409
honesty value is: 1
connectto juror 1
peter2 vivaldi 6002 J SEND SECRET KEY U
593
433
honesty value is: 2
connect to juror 2
peter8 vivaldi 6008 J SEND SECRET KEY U
607
887
honesty value is: 3
connect to juror 3
peter5 vivaldi 6005 J SEND SECRET KEY U
397
971
honesty value is: 4
connect to juror 4
peter 10 vivaldi 6010 J SEND SECRET KEY U
827
409
honesty value is: 5
EA is honest!!!
Request Jury EA SEND JKEYS U
pk of juror 0 911
210871
pk of juror 1 167 280151
pk of juror 2 121
186503
pk of juror 3 443 437579
pk of juror 4 787
507427
Challenge or Accept jury now!!!
Challenge Jury
EA SEND JINFO U
connect to juror 0
peter2 vivaldi 6002 J SEND SECRET KEY U
433
487
honesty value is: 1
connect to juror 1
peter6 vivaldi 6006 J SEND SECRET KEY U
647
433
honesty value is: 2
connect to juror 2
peter8 vivaldi 6008 J SEND SECRET KEY U
443
421
honesty value is: 3
connect to juror 3
peter 1 vivaldi 6001 J SEND SECRET KEY U
467
937
honesty value is: 4
connect to juror 4
peter4 vivaldi 6004 J SEND SECRET KEY U
557
911
honesty value is: 5
EA is honest!!!
Request Jury EA SEND JKEYS U
pk of juror 0 221
235981
pk of juror 1 907
403127
pk of juror 2 71
235387
pk of juror 3 439
166217
pk of juror 4 655
71677
Challenge or Accept jury now!!!
Challenge Jury
EA SEND JINFO U
connect to juror 0
peter6 vivaldi 6006 J SEND SECRET KEY U
367
643
honesty value is: 1
connect to juror 1
peter7 vivaldi 6007 J SEND SECRET KEY U
673
599
honesty value is: 2
connect to juror 2
peter4 vivaldi 6004 J SEND SECRET KEY U

587
401
honesty value is: 3
connect to juror 3
peterS vivaldi 6005 J SEND SECRET KEY U
463
359
honesty value is: 4
connect to juror 4
peter9 vivaldi 6009 J SEND SECRET KEY U
313
229
honesty value is: 5
EA is honest!!!
Request Jury EASENDJKEYSU
pk of juror 0 727
398687
pk of juror 1 503
797191
pk of juror 2 247
151447
pk of juror 3 509
330007
pk of juror 4 691
130381
Challenge or Accept jury now ! ! !
next step : Generate Keys ! ! !
Generate Keys and write to file
p : 1 3 9 q : 7 1 n: 9869 m: 9660 pubUckey:169 private key: 1429 e * d m o d m =
p:43 q: 157 n: 6751 m: 6552 pubnckey:881 private key: 1889 e * d m o d m =
p: 109 q: 157 n: 17113 m: 16848 public key: 191 private key: 13055 e * d mod m =
p: 131 q: 173 n: 22663 m: 22360 public key: 943 private key: 21127 e * d mod m =
p: 199 q: 97 n: 19303 m: 19008 public key: 181 private key: 6301 e * d mod m =
p: 167 q: 157 n: 26219 m: 25896 pubUc key: 997 private key: 22909 e * d mod m =
p: 131 q: 173 n: 22663 m: 22360 pubUc key: 61 private key: 19061 e * d mod m =
p: 167 q: 193 n: 32231 m: 31872 pubUc key: 349 private key: 9589 e * d mod m =
p: 139 q: 173 n: 24047 m: 23736 pubUc key: 401 private key: 16337 e * d mod m =
p : 1 0 9 q : 7 1 n: 7739 m: 7560 public key: 179 private key: 4139 e * d m o d m =
Read file and Generate Shares
r = 642873293 coeff 0 = 1429 coeff 1 = 172 coeff 2 = 319
share 0 = 1920 share 1 = 3049 share 2 = 4816 share 3 = 7221 share 4 = 10264
r = 844907627 coeff 0 = 1889 coeff 1 = 847 coeff 2 = 73
share 0 = 2809 share 1 = 3875 share 2 = 5087 share 3 = 6445 share 4 = 7949
r = 664502803 coeff 0 = 13055 coeff 1 = 219 coeff 2 = 151
share 0 = 13425 share 1 = 14097 share 2 = 15071 share 3 = 16347 share 4 = 17925
r = 379350749 coeff 0 = 21127 coeff 1=417 coeff 2 = 300
share 0 = 21844 share 1 = 23161 share 2 = 25078 share 3 = 27595 share 4 = 30712
r = 428969557 coeff 0 = 6301 coeff 1 = 154 coeff 2 = 437
share 0 = 6892 share 1 = 8357 share 2 = 10696 share 3 = 13909 share 4 = 17996
r = 631253789 coeff 0 = 22909 coeff 1 = 521 coeff 2 = 594
share 0 = 24024 share 1 = 26327 share 2 = 29818 share 3 = 34497 share 4 = 40364
r = 973767029 coeff 0 = 19061 coeff 1 = 10 coeff 2 = 714
share 0 = 19785 share 1 = 21937 share 2 = 25517 share 3 = 30525 share 4 = 36961
r = 636357217 coeff 0 = 9589 coeff 1 = 30 coeff 2 = 956
share 0 = 10575 share 1 = 13473 share 2 = 18283 share 3 = 25005 share 4 = 33639
r = 808230767 coeff 0 = 16337 coeff 1 = 526 coeff 2 = 233
share 0 = 17096 share 1 = 18321 share 2 = 20012 share 3 = 22169 share 4 = 24792
r = 500158847 coeff 0 = 4139 coeff 1 =458 coeff 2 = 927
share 0 = 5524 share 1 = 8763 share 2 = 13856 share 3 = 20803 share 4 = 29604
Send encrypted shares to Jury send cac public keys to EA first
pk, n, r for i = 0 169 9869 642873293 pk, n, r for = 1 881
" " 6751 844907627
pk, n, r for i = 2 191 17113 664502803 pk, n, r for = 3 943 22663 379350749
pk, n , r f o r i = 4 181 19303 428969557 p k , n , r f o r = 5 997 26219 631253789
pk, n, r for i = 6 61 22663 973767029 pk, n, r for = 7 349 32231 636357217
pk, n , r f o r i = 8 401 24047 808230767 pk, n, r for i = 9 179 7739 500158847
send encrypted shares to jurors via EA
shares to juror 0
392823 359371 133254 314297 21310 382979 239508 275098 20710 345187

shares to juror 1
252777 496631 569178 788925 360335 396526 472822 251095 222202 71865
shares to juror 2
6565 26846 52447 93512 139060 51523 30440 94981 132817 120791
shares to juror 3
231785 188635 27217 80887 31882 15455 4532 299004 253339 216669
shares to juror 4
67411 119540 117940 17958 37591 16252 54236 57702 101254 94160
EA accepts key registration chosen key no: 3
pk:943 sk: 21127 n: 22663 key escrow done!!!

/*

Content of Ukey.dat before cut-and-choose protocol
*/
169 1429 9869
881 1889 6751
191 13055 17113
943 21127 22663
181 6301 19303
997 22909 26219
61 19061 22663
349 9589 32231
401 16337 24047
179 4139 7739

/*
Content of Ukey.dat after cut-and-choose protocol
943

/*

21127

22663

output from EA
*/
User request
record user info
name
uow 8888 0
UREQEA
summons the jury
EAREQJLA
EA SEND JKEYS U
LA SEND J EA
read jury's connection information
Juror 0 peter3 vivaldi 6003 peter3 vivaldi 6003
EA SUMMON J 0 JUROR SEND KEY EA 499 164009
Juror 1 peter2 vivaldi 6002 peter2 vivaldi 6002
EA SUMMON J 0 JUROR SEND KEY EA 475 256769
Juror 2 peter8 vivaldi 6008 peter8 vivaldi 6008
EA SUMMON J 0 JUROR SEND KEY EA 823 538409
Juror 3 peter5 vivaldi 6005 peter5 vivaldi 6005
EA SUMMON J 0 JUROR SEND KEY EA 727 385487
Juror 4 peterlO vivaldi 6010 peterlO vivaldi 6010
EA SUMMON J
0 JUROR SEND KEY EA 865 338243
U CHALLENGE J EA challenge of jury

EA SEND JINFO U
EA CHALLENGE J peter3 vivaldi 6003
EA CHALLENGE J peter2 vivaldi 6002
EA CHALLENGE J peterS vivaldi 6008
EA CHALLENGE J peter5 vivaldi 6005
EA CHALLENGE J peterlO vivaldi 6010
U REQ E A summons the jury
EAREQJLA
EA SEND JKEYS U
LA SEND J EA
read jury's connection information
Juror 0 peter2 vivaldi 6002 peter2 vivaldi 6002
EA SUMMON J 0 JUROR SEND KEY EA 911 210871
Juror 1 peter6 vivaldi 6006 peter6 vivaldi 6006
EA SUMMON J 0 JUROR SEND KEY EA 167 280151
Juror 2 peter8 vivaldi 6008 peter8 vivaldi 6008
EA SUMMON J 0 JUROR SEND KEY EA 121 186503
Juror 3 peter 1 vivaldi 6001 peter 1 vivaldi 6001
EA SUMMON J 0 JUROR SEND KEY EA 443 437579
Juror 4 peter4 vivaldi 6004 peter4 vivaldi 6004
EA SUMMON J 0 JUROR SEND KEY EA 787 507427
U CHALLENGE J EA challenge of jury
EA SEND JINFO U
EA CHALLENGE J peter2 vivaldi 6002
EA CHALLENGE J peter6 vivaldi 6006
EA CHALLENGE J peterS vivaldi 6008
EA CHALLENGE J peterl vivaldi 6001
EA CHALLENGE J peter4 vivaldi 6004
UREQEA
summons the jury
EAREQJLA
EA SEND JKEYS U
LA SEND J EA
read jury's connection information
Juror 0 peter6 vivaldi 6006 peter6 vivaldi 6006
EA SUMMON J 0 JUROR SEND KEY EA 221 235981
Juror 1 peter7 vivaldi 6007 peter7 vivaldi 6007
EA SUMMON J 0
JUROR SEND KEY EA 907 403127
Juror 2 peter4 vivaldi 6004 peter4 vivaldi 6004
EA SUMMON J 0
JUROR SEND KEY EA 71 235387
Juror 3 peter5 vivaldi 6005 peter5 vivaldi 6005
EA SUMMON J 0
JUROR SEND KEY EA 439 166217
Juror 4 peter9 vivaldi 6009 peter9 vivaldi 6009
EA SUMMON J 0
JUROR SEND KEY EA 655 71677
U CHALLENGE J EA challenge of jury

EA SEND JINFO U
EA CHALLENGE J peter6 vivaldi 6006

EA CHALLENGE J peter? vivaldi 6007
EA CHALLENGE J peter4 vivaldi 6004
EA CHALLENGE J peter5 vivaldi 6005
EA CHALLENGE J petei9 vivaldi 6009
UREQEA
summons the jury
EAREQJLA
EA SEND JKEYS U
LA SEND JEA
read jury's connection information
Juror 0 peter5 vivaldi 6005 peter5 vivaldi 6005
EA SUMMON J 0
JUROR SEND KEY EA 727 398687
Juror 1 peter6 vivaldi 6006 peter6 vivaldi 6006
EA SUMMON J 0
JUROR SEND KEY EA 503 797191
Juror 2 peter2 vivaldi 6002 peter2 vivaldi 6002
EA SUMMON J 0
JUROR SEND KEY EA 247 151447
Juror 3 peter 10 vivaldi
6010 peterlO vivaldi 6010
EA SUMMON J 0
JUROR SEND KEY EA 509 330007
Juror 4 peter7 vivaldi 6007 peter7 vivaldi 6007
EA SUMMON J 0
JUROR SEND KEY EA 691 130381
U SEND SHARES EA call AcceptJ
U SEND SHARES EA
read cac pk, n and r
user key: 0 169 9869 642873293
user key: 1 881 6751 844907627
user key: 2 191 17113 664502803
user key: 3 943 22663 379350749
user key: 4 181 19303 428969557
user key: 5 997 26219 631253789
user key: 6 61 22663 973767029
user key: 7 349 32231 636357217
user key: 8 401 24047 808230767
user key: 9 179 7739 500158847
read all shares from user and send all shares to jurors
juror: 0
encrypted share: 0 392823 encrypted share: 1 359371
encrypted share: 2 133254 encrypted share: 3 314297
encrypted share: 4 21310 encrypted share: 5 382979
encrypted share: 6 239508 encrypted share: 7 275098
encrypted share: 8 20710 encrypted share: 9 345187
juror: 1
encrypted share: 0 252777 encrypted share: 1 496631
encrypted share: 2 569178 encrypted share: 3 788925
encrypted share: 4 360335 encrypted share: 5 396526
encrypted share: 6 472822 encrypted share: 7 251095
encrypted share: 8 222202 encrypted share: 9 71865

juror: 2
encrypted share: 0 6565 encrypted share: 1 26846
encrypted share: 2 52447 encrypted share: 3 93512
encrypted share: 4 139060 encrypted share: 5 51523
encrypted share: 6 30440 encrypted share: 7 94981
encrypted share: 8 132817 encrypted share: 9 120791
juror: 3
encrypted share: 0 231785 encrypted share: 1 188635
encrypted share: 2 27217 encrypted share: 3 80887
encrypted share: 4 31882 encrypted share: 5 15455
encrypted share: 6 4532 encrypted share: 7 299004
encrypted share: 8 253339 encrypted share: 9 216669
juror: 4
encrypted share: 0 67411 encrypted share: 1 119540
encrypted share: 2 117940 encrypted share: 3 17958
encrypted share: 4 37591 encrypted share: 5 16252
encrypted share: 6 54236 encrypted share: 7 57702
encrypted share: 8 101254 encrypted share: 9 94160
chosen no: 3
jury send unchosen keys to EA
juror: 0
decrypted share: 0 1920 decrypted share: 1 2809
decrypted share: 2 13425
decrypted share: 3
decrypted share: 4 6892 decrypted share: 5 24024
decrypted share: 6 19785 decrypted share: 7 10575
decrypted share: 8 17096 decrypted share: 9 5524
juror: 1
decrypted share: 0 3049 decrypted share: 1 3875
decrypted share: 2 14097
decrypted share: 3
decrypted share: 4 8357 decrypted share: 5 26327
decrypted share: 6 21937 decrypted share: 7 13473
decrypted share: 8 18321 decrypted share: 9 8763
juror: 2
decrypted share: 0 4816 decrypted share: 1 5087
decrypted share: 2 15071
decrypted share: 3
decrypted share: 4 10696 decrypted share: 5 29818
decrypted share: 6 25517 decrypted share: 7 18283
decrypted share: 8 20012 decrypted share: 9 13856
juror: 3
decrypted share: 0 7221 decrypted share: 1 6445
decrypted share: 2 16347
decrypted share: 3
decrypted share: 4 13909 decrypted share: 5 34497
decrypted share: 6 30525 decrypted share: 7 25005
decrypted share: 8 22169 decrypted share: 9 20803
juror: 4 d
ecrypted share: 0 10264 decrypted share: 1 7949
decrypted share: 2 17925
decrypted share: 3

decrypted share: 4 17996 decrypted share: 5 40364
decrypted share: 6 36961 decrypted share: 7 33639
decrypted share: 8 24792 decrypted share: 9 29604
verify shares are correct
recovered sk: 1429 honesty value: 1 recovered sk: 1889 honesty value: 2
recovered sk: 13055 honesty value: 3 recovered sk: 6301 honesty value: 4
recovered sk: 22909 honesty value: 5 recovered sk: 19061 honesty value: 6
recovered sk: 9589 honesty value: 7 recovered sk: 16337 honesty value: 8
recovered sk: 4139 honesty value: 9
ACCEPT KEY
LEA requests suspect's key
send r :379350749
LEA REQ JURY EA
EA SEND JURY INFO LEA
send suspect's jury
peter5 vivaldi 6005 peter6 vivaldi 6006 peter2 vivaldi 6002
peterlO vivaldi 6010 peter7 vivaldi 6007

/*

output from LA
*/
read juror file
peter 1 vivaldi 6001 peter2 vivaldi 6002 peter3
peter4 vivaldi 6004 peter5 vivaldi 6005 peter6
peter7 vivaldi 6007 peter8 vivaldi 6008 peter9
peter 10 vivaldi 6010
EAREQJLA
send jury to EA
peter3 vivaldi 6003 peter2 vivaldi 6002 peterS
peter5 vivaldi 6005 peterlO vivaldi 6010
EAREQJLA
send jury to EA
peter2 vivaldi 6002 peter6 vivaldi 6006 peter8
peter 1 vivaldi 6001 peter4 vivaldi 6004
EAREQJLA
send jury to EA
peter6 vivaldi 6006 peter7 vivaldi 6007 peter4
peter5 vivaldi 6005 peter9
vivaldi 6009
EAREQJLA
send jury to EA
peter5 vivaldi 6005 peter6 vivaldi 6006 peter2
peterlO vivaldi 6010 peter7 vivaldi 6007

vivaldi 6003
vivaldi 6006
vivaldi 6009

vivaldi 6008

vivaldi 6008

vivaldi 6004

vivaldi 6002

output from juror 1
juror port: 6001
EA SUMMON J
p:467 q:937 n: 437579 m: 436176 public key: 443 private key: 97475
e * d mod m = 1
JUROR SEND KEY EA
443 437579
U CHALLENGE J user challenges this juror
J SEND SECRET KEY U 467 937

output from juror 2
juror port: 6002
EA SUMMON J
p:593 q:433 n: 256769 m: 255744 pubUckey:475 private key: 38227
e * d mod m = 1
JUROR SEND KEY EA 475 256769
U CHALLENGE J user challenges this juror
J SEND SECRET KEY U 593 433
EA SUMMON J p:433 q: 487 n: 210871 m: 209952
public key: 911 private key: 31343 e * d mod m = 1
JUROR SEND KEY EA 911 210871
U CHALLENGE J user challenges this juror
J SEND SECRET KEY U 433 487
EA SUMMON J
p:269 q:563 n: 151447 m: 150616
public key: 247 private key: 131103 e * d mod m = 1
JUROR SEND KEY EA 247 151447
user accepts this juror
EA SEND SHARES J
read in cac shares from the user via EA
share 0 encrypted: 6565 decrypted: 4816
share 1 encrypted: 26846 decrypted: 5087
share 2 encrypted: 52447 decrypted: 15071
share 3 encrypted: 93512 decrypted: 25078
share 4 encrypted: 139060 decrypted: 10696
share 5 encrypted: 51523 decrypted: 29818
share 6 encrypted: 30440 decrypted: 25517
share 7 encrypted: 94981 decrypted: 18283
shares encrypted: 132817 decrypted: 20012
share 9 encrypted: 120791 decrypted: 13856
EA CHOOSE KEY J
chosen no: 3
LEA RECOVER J
key recovery request from LEA
J SEND SHARE LEA
25078

output from juror 3
*/
juror port: 6003
EA SUMMON J
p:401 q:409 n: 164009 m: 163200 public key: 499 private key 151099
e * d mod m = 1
JUROR SEND KEY EA
499 164009
U CHALLENGE J user challenges this juror
J SEND SECRET KEY U 401 409

output from juror 4
juror port: 6004
EA SUMMON J
p:557 q:911 n: 507427 m: 505960
public key: 787 private key: 462243 e * d mod m = 1
JUROR SEND KEY EA 787 507427
U CHALLENGE J user challenges this juror
J SEND SECRET KEY U 557 911
EA SUMMON J
p:587 q:401 n: 235387 m: 234400
public key: 71 private key: 72631 e * d mod m = 1
JUROR SEND KEY EA 71 235387
U CHALLENGE J user challenges this juror
J SEND SECRET KEY U 587 401

output from juror 5
juror port: 6005
EA SUMMON J
p:397 q:971 n: 385487 m: 384120
public key: 727 private key: 289543 e * d mod m = 1
JUROR SEND KEY EA 727 385487
U CHALLENGE J user challenges this juror
J SEND SECRET KEY U 397 971
EA SUMMON J
p: 463 q: 359 n: 166217 m:165396
public key: 439 private key: 105115 e * d mod m = 1
JUROR SEND KEY EA 439 166217
U CHALLENGE J user challenges this juror
J SEND SECRET KEY U 463 359
EA SUMMON J
p:947 q:421 n: 398687 m: 397320
public key: 727 private key: 13663 e * d mod m = 1
JUROR SEND KEY EA 727 398687
user accepts this juror

EA SEND SHARES J
read in cac shares from the user via EA
share 0 encrypted: 392823 decrypted: 1920
share 1 encrypted: 359371 decrypted: 2809
share 2 encrypted: 133254 decrypted: 13425
share 3 encrypted: 314297 decrypted: 21844
share 4 encrypted: 21310 decrypted: 6892
share 5 encrypted: 382979 decrypted: 24024
share 6 encrypted: 239508 decrypted: 19785
share 7 encrypted: 275098 decrypted: 10575
share 8 encrypted: 20710 decrypted: 17096
share 9 encrypted: 345187 decrypted: 5524
EA CHOOSE KEY J
chosen no: 3
LEA RECOVER J
key recovery request from LEA
J SEND SHARE LEA
21844

/*

output from juror 6

juror port: 6006
EA SUMMON J
p:647 q:433 n: 280151 m: 279072
public key: 167 private key: 148727 e * d mod m = 1
JUROR SEND KEY EA 167 280151
U CHALLENGE J user challenges this juror
J SEND SECRET KEY U 647 433
EA SUMMON J
p:367 q:643 n: 235981 m: 234972
public key: 221 private key: 9569 e * d mod m = 1
JUROR SEND KEY EA 221 235981
U CHALLENGE J user challenges this juror
J SEND SECRET KEY U
367 643
EA SUMMON J
p:821 q:971 n: 797191 m: 795400
public key: 503 private key: 273567 e * d mod m = 1
JUROR SEND KEY EA 503 797191
user accepts this juror
EA SEND SHARES J
read in cac shares from the user via EA
share 0 encrypted: 252777 decrypted: 3049
share 1 encrypted: 496631 decrypted: 3875
share 2 encrypted: 569178 decrypted: 14097
share 3 encrypted: 788925 decrypted: 23161
share 4 encrypted: 360335 decrypted: 8357
share 5 encrypted: 396526 decrypted: 26327
share 6 encrypted: 472822 decrypted: 21937
share 7 encrypted: 251095 decrypted: 13473

share 8 encrypted: 222202 decrypted: 18321
share 9 encrypted: 71865 decrypted: 8763
EA CHOOSE KEY J
chosen no: 3
LEA RECOVER J
key recovery request from LEA
J SEND SHARE LEA
23161

/*

output from juror 7

juror port: 6007
EA SUMMON!
p:673 q:599 n: 403127 m: 401856
public key: 907 private key: 387235 e * d mod m = 1
JUROR SEND KEY EA 907 403127
U CHALLENGE J user challenges this juror
J SEND SECRET KEY U 673 599
EA SUMMON J
p: 541 q: 241 n: 130381 m:129600
public key: 691 private key: 81211 e * d mod m = 1
JUROR SEND KEY EA 691 130381
user accepts this juror
EA SEND SHARES J
read in cac shares from the user via EA
share 0 encrypted: 67411 decrypted: 10264
share 1 encrypted: 119540 decrypted: 7949
share 2 encrypted: 117940 decrypted: 17925
share 3 encrypted: 17958 decrypted: 30712
share 4 encrypted: 37591 decrypted: 17996
share 5 encrypted: 16252 decrypted: 40364
share 6 encrypted: 54236 decrypted: 36961
share 7 encrypted: 57702 decrypted: 33639
share 8 encrypted: 101254 decrypted: 24792
share 9 encrypted: 94160 decrypted: 29604
EA CHOOSE KEY J
chosen no: 3
LEA RECOVER J
key recovery request from LEA
J SEND SHARE LEA
30712

/*

output from juror 8
*/
juror port: 6008
EA SUMMON J
p:607 q:887 n: 538409 m: 536916
public key: 823 private key: 11743 e * d mod m = 1
JUROR SEND KEY EA 823 538409
U CHALLENGE J user challenges this juror

J SEND SECRET KEY U 607 887
EA SUMMON J
p:443 q:421 n: 186503 m: 185640
public key: 121 private key: 164161 e * d mod m = 1
JUROR SEND KEY EA 121 186503
U CHALLENGE J user challenges this juror
J SEND SECRET KEY U 443 421

output from juror 9
juror port: 6009
EA SUMMON J
p:313 q:229 n: 71677 m: 71136
public key: 655 private key: 37903 e * d mod m = 1
JUROR SEND KEY EA 655 71677
U CHALLENGE J user challenges this juror
J SEND SECRET KEY U 313 229

output from juror 10
juror port: 6010
EA SUMMON J
p:827 q:409 n: 338243 m: 337008
public key: 865 private key: 16753 e * d mod m = 1
JUROR SEND KEY EA 865 338243
U CHALLENGE J user challenges this juror
J SEND SECRET KEY U 827 409
EA SUMMON J
p:331 q:997 n: 330007 m: 328680
public key: 509 private key: 12269 e * d mod m = 1
JUROR SEND KEY EA 509 330007
user accepts this juror
EA SEND SHARES J
read in cac shares from the user via EA
share 0 encrypted: 231785 decrypted: 7221
share 1 encrypted: 188635 decrypted: 6445
share 2 encrypted: 27217 decrypted: 16347
share 3 encrypted: 80887 decrypted: 27595
share 4 encrypted: 31882 decrypted: 13909
share 5 encrypted: 15455 decrypted: 34497
share 6 encrypted: 4532 decrypted: 30525
share 7 encrypted: 299004 decrypted: 25005
share 8 encrypted: 253339 decrypted: 22169
share 9 encrypted: 216669 decrypted: 20803
EA CHOOSE KEY J
chosen no: 3

/*

output from LEA
*/
LEA RECOVER J
key recovery request from LEA
J SEND SHARE LEA 27595 379350749
Request Jury's Shares
EA SEND JURY INFO LEA
info of juror 0 peter5 vivaldi 6005 J SEND SHARE LEA 21844
info of juror 1 peter6 vivaldi 6006 J SEND SHARE LEA 23161
info of juror 2 peter2 vivaldi 6002 J SEND SHARE LEA 25078
info of juror 3 peter 10 vivaldi 6010 J SEND SHARE LEA 27595
info of juror 4 peter7 vivaldi 6007 J SEND SHARE LEA 30712
suspect's sk: 21127

The following is the output of all entities when the user tries to cheat.
/*
Output from the user
*/
User Registration Information null vivaldi 3838
Trying to connect to EA... Connected to EA, request jury now!!! Request Jury
EA SEND JKEYS U
pk of juror 0 23 322061 pk of juror 1 151 710453 pk of juror 2 457 279827
pk of juror 3 947 177311 pk of juror 4 461 634877
Challenge or Accept jury now!!! next step: Generate Keys!!!
Generate Keys and write to file
p: 193 q: 181 n: 34933 m:34560
public key: 719 private key: 33839 e * d mod m = 1
p: 181 q: 179 n: 32399 m: 32040
public key: 683 private key: 2627 e * d mod m = 1
p: 179 q:113 n: 20227 m: 19936
public key: 949 private key: 5693 e * d mod m = 1
p: 199 q:191 n: 38009 m:37620
public key: 643 private key: 20887 e * d mod m = 1
p: 131 q: 137 n: 17947 m:17680
public key: 939 private key: 659 e * d mod m = 1
p:199 q:131 n: 26069 m: 25740
public key: 797 private key: 6653 e * d mod m = 1
p: 179 q: 47 n: 8413 m: 8188
public key: 751 private key: 7403 e * d mod m = 1
p:157 q:179 n: 28103 m: 27768
public key: 197 private key: 3101 e * d mod m = 1
p: 103 q: 191 n: 19673 m:19380
public key: 431 private key: 5171 e * d mod m = 1
p: 137 q: 157 n:21509 m:21216
public key: 155 private key: 6707 e * d mod m = 1
Read file and Generate Shares
r = 724948453 coeff 0 = 33839 coeffl = 48 coeff2 = 312
share 0 = 34199 share 1 =35183 share 2 = 36791 share 3 = 39023 share 4 = 41879
r = 341324441 coeff 0 = 2627 coeff 1 = 1 coeff 2 = 726
share 0 = 3354 share 1 =5533 share 2 = 9164 share 3 = 14247 share 4 = 20782
r = 817614947 coeff 0 = 5893 coeff 1 =703 coeff 2 = 349
share 0 = 6945 share 1 = 8695 share 2 = 11143 share 3 = 14289 share 4 = 18133
r = 649524781 coeff 0 = 20887 coeff 1 =428 coeff 2 = 410
share 0 = 21725 share 1 = 23383 share 2 = 25861 share 3 = 29159 share 4 = 33277
r = 944068087 coeff 0 = 659 coeff 1 = 376 coeff 2 =158
share 0 = 1 1 9 3 share 1 =2043 share 2 = 3209 share 3 = 4691 share 4 = 6489
r = 839164757 coeff 0 = 6653 coeff 1 = 923 coeff 2 =121
share 0 = 7697 share 1 = 8983 share 2 =10511 share 3 = 12281 share 4 = 14293
r = 998202529 coeff 0 = 7403 coeff 1 =486 coeff2 = 319
share 0 = 8208 share 1 =9651 share 2 = 11732 share 3 = 14451 share 4 = 17808
r = 767927183 coeff0 = 3101 coeff 1=442 coeff 2 = 474
share 0 = 4017 share 1 =5881 share 2 = 8693 share 3 = 12453 share 4 = 17161

r = 581973499 coeffO = 5171 coeff 1 = 489 coeff 2 = 380
share 0 = 6040 share 1 = 7669 share 2 = 10058 share 3 = 13207 share 4 = 17116
r = 824250523 coeff 0 = 6707 coeff 1 =483 coeff 2 = 569
share 0 = 7759 share 1 = 9949 share 2 = 13277 share 3 = 17743 share 4 = 23347
Send encrypted shares to Jury
send cac public keys to EA first
pk, n, r for i = 0 719 34933 724948453
pk, n, r for i = 1 683 32399 341324441
pk, n, r for i = 2 949 20227 817614947
pk, n, r for i = 3 643 38009 649524781
pk, n, r for i = 4 939 17947 944068087
pk, n, r for i = 5 797 26069 839164757
pk, n, r for i = 6 751 8413 998202529
pk, n, r for i = 7 197 28103 767927183
pk, n, r for i = 8 431 19673 581973499
pk, n, r for i = 9 155 21509 824250523
send encrypted shares to jurors via EA
shares to juror 0
275095 238011 40948 84600 278641
16555 23254 179358 38512 202310
shares to juror 1
366300 547319 174025 63640 306329
164921 51346 349809 617423 579472
shares to juror 2
36147 147225 269222 277293 260989
164241 238431 60048 203999 231086
shares to juror 3
55233 117913 116431 171653 158394
36519 3728 93513 128136 66940
shares to juror 4
133036 81613 416270 273670 606899
539352 599243 540041 308054 464585
You are caught cheating!!!

key pairs in Ukey.dat
*/
719
33839
683
2627
949
5693
20887
643
659
939
6653
797
7403
751
3101
197
5171
431
6707
155

before tampering
34933
32399
20227
38009
17947
26069
8413
28103
19673
21509

/*

key pairs in Ukey.dat after tampering
*/
719 33839
34933
683 2627
32399
949 5893
20227 /*tampered secret key*/
643 20887
38009
939 659
17947
797 6653
26069
751 7403
8413
197 3101
28103
431 5171
19673
155 6707
21509
/*

output from EA
*/
User request record user info name uow 8888 0
U REQ EA summons the jury
EAREQJLA
EA SEND JKEYS U
LA SEND J EA
read jury's connection information
Juror 0 peterl vivaldi 6001 peterl vivaldi 6001
EA SUMMON J 0 JUROR SEND KEY EA 23 322061
Juror 1 peter2 vivaldi 6002 peter2 vivaldi 6002
EA SUMMON J 0 JUROR SEND KEY EA 151 710453
Juror 2 peter5 vivaldi 6005 peter5 vivaldi 6005
EA SUMMON J 0 JUROR SEND KEY EA 457 279827
Juror 3 peter8 vivaldi 6008 peterS vivaldi 6008
EA SUMMON J 0 JUROR SEND KEY EA 947 177311
Juror 4 peter6 vivaldi 6006 peter6 vivaldi 6006
EA SUMMON J 0 JUROR SEND KEY EA 461 634877
U SEND SHARES EA callAcceptJ
U SEND SHARES EA
read cac pk, n and r
724948453
user key: 0 719 34933
341324441
user key: 1 683 32399
817614947
user key: 2 949 20227
649524781
user key: 3 643 38009
944068087
user key: 4 939 17947
839164757
user key: 5 797 26069
998202529
user key: 6 751 8413
767927183
user key: 7 197 28103
581973499
user key: 8 431 19673
824250523
user key: 9 155 21509
read all shares from user and send all shares to jurors
juror: 0
encrypted share: 0 275095 encrypted share: 1 238011
encrypted share: 2 40948 encrypted share: 3 84600

encrypted share: 4
encrypted share: 6
encrypted share: 8
juror: 1
encrypted share: 0
encrypted share: 2
encrypted share: 4
encrypted share: 6
encrypted share: 8
juror: 2
encrypted share: 0
encrypted share: 2
encrypted share: 4
encrypted share: 6
encrypted share: 8
juror: 3
encrypted share: 0
encrypted share: 2
encrypted share: 4
encrypted share: 6
encrypted share: 8
juror: 4
encrypted share: 0
encrypted share: 2
encrypted share: 4
encrypted share: 6
encrypted share: 8
chosen no: 3
jury send unchosen
juror: 0
decrypted share: 0
decrypted share: 3
decrypted share: 4
decrypted share: 7
juror: 1
decrypted share: 0
decrypted share: 3
decrypted share: 4
decrypted share: 7
juror: 2
decrypted share: 0
decrypted share: 3
decrypted share: 4
decrypted share: 7
juror: 3
decrypted share: 0
decrypted share: 3
decrypted share: 4
decrypted share: 7
juror: 4
decrypted share: 0
decrypted share: 3

278641 encrypted share: 5 16555
23254 encrypted share: 7 179358
38512 encrypted share: 9 202310
366300 encrypted share: 1 547319
174025 encrypted share: 3 63640
306329 encrypted share: 5 164921
51346 encrypted share: 7 349809
617423 encrypted share: 9 579472
36147
269222
260989
238431
203999

encrypted share: 1
encrypted share: 3
encrypted share: 5
encrypted share: 7
encrypted share: 9

147225
277293
164241
60048
231086

55233 encrypted share: 1 117913
116431 encrypted share: 3 171653
158394 encrypted share: 5 36519
3728 encrypted share: 7 93513
128136 encrypted share: 9 66940
133036
416270
606899
599243
308054

encrypted
encrypted
encrypted
encrypted
encrypted

share: 1
share: 3
share: 5
share: 7
share: 9

81613
273670
539352
540041
464585

keys to EA
34199 decrypted share: 1 3354 decrypted share: 2 6945
1193 decrypted share: 5 7697 decrypted share: 6 8208
4017 decrypted share: 8 6040 decrypted share: 9 7759
35183 decrypted share: 1 5533 decrypted share: 2 8695
2043 decrypted share: 5 8983 decrypted share: 6 9651
5881 decrypted share: 8 7669 decrypted share: 9 9949
36791 decrypted share: 1 9164 decrypted share: 2 11143
3209 decrypted share: 5 10511 decrypted share: 6 11732
8693 decrypted share: 8 10058 decrypted share: 9 13277
39023 decrypted share: 1 14247 decrypted share: 2 14289
4691 decrypted share: 5 12281 decrypted share: 6 14451
12453 decrypted share: 8 13207 decrypted share: 9 17743
41879 decrypted share: 1 20782 decrypted share: 2 18133

decrypted share: 4 6489 decrypted share: 5 14293 decrypted share: 6 17808
decrypted share: 7 17161 decrypted share: 8 17116 decrypted share: 9 23347
verify shares are correct
recovered sk: 33839 honesty value: 1
recovered sk: 2627 honesty value: 2
recovered sk: 5893 honesty value: 2
recovered sk: 659 honesty value: 3
recovered sk: 6653 honesty value: 4
recovered sk: 7403 honesty value: 5
recovered sk: 3101 honesty value: 6
recovered sk: 5171 honesty value: 7
recovered sk: 6707 honesty value: 8
not ACCEPT KEY
/*

output from LA
*/
EAREQJLA
send jury to EA
peter 1 vivaldi 6001
peter2 vivaldi 6002
peter5 vivaldi 6005
peter8 vivaldi 6008
peter6 vivaldi 6006

juror port: 6001
EA SUMMON J
p:443 q:727 n: 322061 m: 320892
public key: 23 private key: 83711 e * d mod m = 1
JUROR SEND KEY EA 23 322061
user accepts this juror
EA SEND SHARES J
read in cac shares from the user via EA
share 0 encrypted: 275095 decrypted: 34199
share 1 encrypted: 238011 decrypted: 3354
share 2 encrypted: 40948 decrypted: 6945
share 3 encrypted: 84600 decrypted: 21725
share 4 encrypted: 278641 decrypted: 1193
share 5 encrypted: 16555 decrypted: 7697
share 6 encrypted: 23254 decrypted: 8208
share 7 encrypted: 179358 decrypted: 4017
share 8 encrypted: 38512 decrypted: 6040
share 9 encrypted: 202310 decrypted: 7759
EA CHOOSE KEY J
chosen no: 3
juror port: 6002
EA SUMMON!
p:857 q:829 n: 710453 m: 708768
public key: 151 private key: 572647 e * d mod m = 1

JUROR SEND KEY EA 151 710453
user accepts this juror
EA SEND SHARES J
read in cac shares from the user via EA
share 0 encrypted: 366300 decrypted: 35183
share 1 encrypted: 547319 decrypted: 5533
share 2 encrypted: 174025 decrypted: 8695
share 3 encrypted: 63640 decrypted: 23383
share 4 encrypted: 306329 decrypted: 2043
share 5 encrypted: 164921 decrypted: 8983
share 6 encrypted: 51346 decrypted: 9651
share 7 encrypted: 349809 decrypted: 5881
share 8 encrypted: 617423 decrypted: 7669
share 9 encrypted: 579472 decrypted: 9949
EA CHOOSE KEY J
chosen no: 3
juror port: 6003
juror port: 6004
juror port: 6005
EA SUMMON J
p:461 q:607 n: 279827 m: 278760
public key: 457 private key: 195193 e * d mod m = 1
JUROR SEND KEY EA 457 279827
user accepts this juror
EA SEND SHARES J
read in cac shares from the user via EA
share 0 encrypted: 36147 decrypted: 36791
share 1 encrypted: 147225 decrypted: 9164
share 2 encrypted: 269222 decrypted: 11143
share 3 encrypted: 277293 decrypted: 25861
share 4 encrypted: 260989 decrypted: 3209
share 5 encrypted: 164241 decrypted: 10511
share 6 encrypted: 238431 decrypted: 11732
share 7 encrypted: 60048 decrypted: 8693
share 8 encrypted: 203999 decrypted: 10058
share 9 encrypted: 231086 decrypted: 13277
EA CHOOSE KEY J
chosen no: 3
juror port: 6006
EA SUMMON J
p:883 q:719 n: 634877 m: 633276
public key: 461 private key: 417605 e * d mod m = 1
JUROR SEND KEY EA 461 634877
user accepts this juror
EA SEND SHARES J
read in cac shares from the user via EA
share 0 encrypted: 133036 decrypted: 41879
share 1 encrypted: 81613 decrypted: 20782

share 2 encrypted: 416270
share 3 encrypted: 273670
share 4 encrypted: 606899
share 5 encrypted: 539352
share 6 encrypted: 599243
share 7 encrypted: 540041
share 8 encrypted: 308054
share 9 encrypted: 464585
EA CHOOSE KEY J
chosen no: 3

decrypted:
decrypted:
decrypted:
decrypted:
decrypted:
decrypted:
decrypted:
decrypted:

18133
33277
6489
14293
17808
17161
17116
23347

juror port: 6007
juror port: 6008
EA SUMMON!
p:281 q:631 n: 177311 m: 176400
public key: 947 private key: 118283 e * d mod m = 1
JUROR SEND KEY EA 947 177311
user accepts this juror
EA SEND SHARES J
read in cac shares from the user via EA
share 0 encrypted: 55233 decrypted: 39023
share 1 encrypted: 117913 decrypted: 14247
share 2 encrypted: 116431 decrypted: 14289
share 3 encrypted: 171653 decrypted: 29159
share 4 encrypted: 158394 decrypted: 4691
share 5 encrypted: 36519 decrypted: 12281
share 6 encrypted: 3728 decrypted: 14451
share 7 encrypted: 93513 decrypted: 12453
share 8 encrypted: 128136 decrypted: 13207
share 9 encrypted: 66940 decrypted: 17743
EA CHOOSE KEY J
chosen no: 3
juror port: 6009
juror port: 6010
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